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ABSTRACT
In this research, we address the impact of data integrity on machine learning algorithms.
We study how an adversary could corrupt Bayesian network structure learning algorithms
by inserting contaminated data items. We investigate the resilience of two commonly
used Bayesian network structure learning algorithms, namely the PC and LCD algorithms,
against data poisoning attacks that aim to corrupt the learned Bayesian network model.
Data poisoning attacks are one of the most important emerging security threats against
machine learning systems. These attacks aim to corrupt machine learning models by con-
taminating datasets in the training phase. The lack of resilience of Bayesian network struc-
ture learning algorithms against such attacks leads to inaccuracies of the learned network
structure.
In this dissertation, we propose two subclasses of data poisoning attacks against Bayes-
ian networks structure learning algorithms: (1) Model invalidation attacks when an ad-
versary poisons the training dataset such that the Bayesian model will be invalid, and
(2) Targeted change attacks when an adversary poisons the training dataset to achieve a
speciﬁc change in the structure. We also deﬁne a novel measure of the strengths of links
between variables in discrete Bayesian networks. We use this measure to ﬁnd vulnera-
ble sub-structure of the Bayesian network model. We use our link strength measure to
ﬁnd the easiest links to break and the most believable links to add to the Bayesian net-
work model. In addition to one-step attacks, we deﬁne long-duration (multi-step) data
poisoning attacks when a malicious attacker attempts to send contaminated cases over a
period of time. We propose to use the distance measure between Bayesian network models
and the value of data conﬂict to detect data poisoning attacks. We propose a 2-layered
v
framework that detects both traditional one-step and sophisticated long-duration data poi-
soning attacks. Layer 1 enforces “reject on negative impacts” detection; i.e., input that
changes the Bayesian network model is labeled potentially malicious. Layer 2 aims to
detect long-duration attacks; i.e., observations in the incoming data that conﬂict with the
original Bayesian model.
Our empirical results show that Bayesian networks are not robust against data poisoning
attacks. However, our framework can be used to detect and mitigate such threats.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning algorithms, including Bayesian Network algorithms, are not secure against
adversarial attacks. A machine learning algorithm is a secure learning algorithm if it func-
tions well in adversarial environments [10]. Recently, several researchers addressed the
problem of attacking machine learning algorithms [10, 16, 63, 50]. Data poisoning at-
tacks are considered one of the most important emerging security threats against machine
learning systems [43]. These attacks aim to corrupt the machine learning model by con-
taminating the data in the training phase.
Data poisoning attacks against Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [16, 66, 67, 47, 42,
19, 32] and Neural Networks (NNs) [69] have been studied extensively. However, we
found no research on evaluating the vulnerabilities of Bayesian network learning algo-
rithms against adversarial attacks.
In this dissertation, we investigate data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network
algorithms. We study two classes of attacks against Bayesian network structure learning
algorithms: model invalidation attacks and targeted change attacks. For model invalidation
attacks, an adversary poisons the training dataset such that the learned Bayesian model will
be invalid. For targeted change attacks, an adversary poisons the training dataset to achieve
a particular goal, such as masking or adding a link in a Bayesian network model [6] [8] [9].
For example, assume that DB1 is a learning dataset, and the model B1 is the learning
outcome when feeding DB1 to a Bayesian network learning algorithm. Figure 1.1 shows
1
Table 1.1: Selected tuples from the original dataset DB1
X B D A S L T E
No Yes No Yes No No Yes No
No No No No No No Yes No
Yes No Yes No No No No No
No No No No No Yes No No
No No No No No No Yes No
No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
. . .
. . .
. . .
No No Yes No No Yes No No
No No No Yes No No Yes No
the learning outcome when feeding DB1 to the PC learning algorithm.
Figure 1.1: The Bayesian learning outcome when feeding DB1 to the PC algorithm
Table 1.1 shows a sample of the original DB1. Assume that the attacker has access to
DB1. If the attacker wants to corrupt the learned model, he/she may modify the data in
DB1. Table 1.2 shows the dataset DB
′
1 with changes of three data items.
Using the new corrupted dataset DB′1, the learned Bayesian model is as shown in Fig-
ure 1.2. In this model (Figure 1.2), the link from node T to node A is missing. Clearly, the
attacker succeeded in corrupting the structure of the model.
2
Table 1.2: DB′1, which is equal to DB1 except for three changes in bold font
X B D A S L T E
No Yes No No No No Yes No
No No No No No No Yes No
Yes No Yes No No No No No
No No No No No Yes No No
No No No No No No Yes No
No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
. . .
. . .
. . .
No No Yes No No Yes No No
No No No Yes No No No No
Figure 1.2: The Bayesian learning outcome when feeding DB1 to the PC algorithm
In this dissertation, we also aim to deﬁne machine learning security best practices with
the goal of detecting and preventing these types of attacks. Succeeding in building a good
defensive measure against these attacks will advance the research ﬁeld of adversarial ma-
chine learning and minimize the risk of data poisoning attacks, which is one of the most
important emerging security threats.
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: we propose two subclasses of
data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms: (1) Model
invalidation attacks when an adversary poisons the training dataset such that the Bayesian
3
network model will be invalid, and (2) Targeted change attacks when an adversary poisons
the training dataset to achieve a speciﬁc change in the learned structure. We deﬁne a novel
measure of strengths of links between variables in discrete Bayesian networks. We show
how to use this measure to evaluate the robustness of Bayesian network models. That is,
we use our link strength measure to ﬁnd the easiest links to break and the most believable
links to add to a given Bayesian network model. In addition to traditional one-step data
poisoning attacks, we deﬁne long-duration data poisoning attacks when an attacker may
spread the malicious workload over a period of time. We propose a 2-layered framework to
detect data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms. Our
2-layered framework detects both one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks. We
use the distance between Bayesian network models, B1 and B2, denoted as ds(B1, B2), to
detect malicious data input (Equation 2.3) for one-step attacks. For long-duration attacks,
we use the value of data conﬂict (Equation 2.5) to detect potentially poisoned data. Our
framework relies on ofﬂine analysis to validate the potentially malicious datasets.
We implement our approaches and apply them to the Chest Clinic Network. Our empir-
ical results show that Bayesian network structure learning algorithms are vulnerable to data
poisoning attacks. Moreover, even a small number of adversarial data may be sufﬁcient to
corrupt the model. We show the effectiveness of our framework to detect both one-step and
long-duration attacks. Our results indicate that the distance measure ds(B1, B2) (Equa-
tion 2.3) and the conﬂict measure Conf(c, B1) (Equation 2.5) are sensitive to poisoned
data.
1.2 RUNNING EXAMPLE AND TEST SETUP
In this dissertation, we demonstrate the robustness of Bayesian network structure learning
algorithms against the proposed data poisoning attacks. We also develop detection methods
against such adversarial attacks. The feasibility of such attacks and detection methods is
investigated through empirical results on the Chest Clinic Network [34].
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To set up the test, we ﬁrst present a canonical Bayesian network, the Chest Clinic
Network (also called Visit to Asia network). The Chest Clinic Network was created by
Lauritzen and Spielgelhalter in 1988 [34]. As shown in Figure 1.3, Visit to Asia is a simple,
ﬁctitious network that could be used at a clinic to diagnose arriving patients. It consists of
8 nodes and 8 edges. The nodes are as follows:
1) (node A) shows whether the patient lately visited Asia;
2) (node S) shows if the patient is a smoker;
3) (node T) shows if the patient has Tuberculosis;
4) (node L) shows if the patient has lung cancer;
5) (node B) shows if the patient has Bronchitis;
6) (node E) shows if the patient has either Tuberculosis or lung cancer;
7) (node X) shows whether the patient X-ray is abnormal; and
8) (node D) shows if the patient has Dyspnea.
The edges indicate the causal relations between the nodes. A simple example for a causal
relation is: Visiting Asia may cause Tuberculosis and so on. Lauritzen and Spielgelhalter’s
complete description of this simple network is as follows:
Shortness-of-breath (dyspnoea) may be due to tuberculosis, lung cancer, or
bronchitis, or none of them, or more than one of them. A recent visit to Asia
increases the chances of tuberculosis, while smoking is known to be a risk
factor for both lung cancer and bronchitis. The results of a single chest X-ray
do not discriminate between lung cancer and tuberculosis, as neither does the
presence or absence of dyspnoea [34].
5
We implemented the Chest Clinic Network using HuginTM Research 8.1. Then we
simulated dataset of 10, 000 cases for our experiments by using HuginTM case genera-
tor [38, 49]. We call this dataset DB1. Using the PC algorithm on dataset DB1 with
0.05 signiﬁcance setting [38], the resulting structure is given in Figure 1.4. Also, Using
the LCD algorithm on dataset DB1 with 0.05 signiﬁcance setting [38], the resulting struc-
ture is given in Figure 1.5. While the networks that were learned by the PC and LCD
algorithms belong to different Markov equivalence classes than the original Chest Clinic
Network, we will use these networks of Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 as the starting points of
our experiments.
A S
T L B
E
X D
Figure 1.3: The original Chest Clinic Network.
A S
T L B
E
X D
Figure 1.4: B1, the result of feeding DB1 to the PC algorithm with signiﬁcance level at
0.05
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X D
Figure 1.5: The Bayesian network model B3, the result of feeding DB1 to the LCD algo-
rithm with signiﬁcance level at 0.05
It is important to point out that proposed attacks require the existence of a triple in
the attacked Bayesian network model and their ease depends on the link strength measure.
Insertion or removal of edges in Bayesian networks is restricted by the topology of the
model. For example, for shielding a collider, it is necessary to insert an edge between
its parents. However, attacks must not violate the requirement that a Bayesian network is
deﬁne as a directed acyclic graph. For example, we cannot insert a new edge from E to
S in the model B1 because it would create a cycle. We will use link strength measures
as a security analysis tool for checking the feasibility of the proposed attacks. Another
important note is that proposed data poisoning attacks may inﬂuence the decision making
process that uses the poisoned model. For example, an attack on the Chest Clinic Network
that aims to mask the edge from smoking, node S, to lung cancer, node L, may impact
decision making as the decision maker will no longer believe that smoking is a cause of
lung cancer. However, analysis of the impact on high-level (abstract) decision making
needs further evaluation. It is not the purpose of this dissertation.
1.3 RESEARCH TASKS
The goals of this dissertation is to address the following major research tasks:
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1. Adversarial Attacks against Bayesian Networks - the goal of this research task is
to determine if adversarial attacks against Bayesian networks exist. The following
subtasks have been completed:
a) Research publications.
b) Deﬁne two subclasses of data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network mod-
els.
c) Develop the threat model.
• Completed: 1a, 1b, 1c
• Remaining: None
• Emad Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Bayesian structure learning
attacks, Tech. report, University of South Carolina, SC, USA, 2018.
2. Link Strength Measure in Discrete Bayesian Networks - the goal of this research
task is to deﬁne a new link strength measure between random variables in discrete
Bayesian networks. The following subtasks have been completed:
a) Research and study existing link strength measures.
b) Propose a new link strength measure deﬁnition.
c) Test our proposed deﬁnition of link strength.
d) Implement our link strength measure and establish the results.
e) Compare our link strength measure with existing measures.
• Completed: 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e
• Remaining: None
• Emad Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas,How to generate the network
you want with the pc learning algorithm, Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on
Uncertainty Processing (WUPES’18), 2018, pp. 1 – 12.
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3. Adversarial Attacks against Bayesian Networks - the goal of this research task is to
study model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation. The following
subtasks have been completed:
a) Develop model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation - creating
a new converging connection (v-structure).
b) Develop an algorithm for attacks based on creating a new converging connection
(v-structure).
c) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
d) Develop model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation - breaking
an existing converging connection (v-structure).
e) Develop an algorithm for attacks based on breaking an existing converging con-
nection (v-structure).
f) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
• Completed: 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f
• Remaining: None
• Emad Alsuwat, Hatim Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Cyber at-
tacks against the pc learning algorithm, 2nd International Workshop on A.I. in
Security, 2018, pp. 19 – 35.
• Emad Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Bayesian structure learning
attacks, Tech. report, University of South Carolina, SC, USA, 2018.
4. Adversarial Attacks against Bayesian Networks - the goal of this research task is to
study model invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests. The follow-
ing subtasks have been completed:
a) Develop model invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests - re-
moving the weakest edge.
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b) Develop an algorithm for attacks based on removing the weakest edge.
c) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
d) Develop model invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests - break-
ing an existing converging connection (v-structure).
e) Develop an algorithm for attacks based on adding the most believable yet incor-
rect edge.
f) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
• Completed: 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d, 4e, 4f
• Remaining: None
• Emad Alsuwat, Hatim Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Cyber at-
tacks against the pc learning algorithm, 2nd International Workshop on A.I. in
Security, 2018, pp. 19 – 35.
• Emad Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Bayesian structure learning
attacks, Tech. report, University of South Carolina, SC, USA, 2018.
5. Adversarial Attacks against Bayesian Networks - the goal of this research task is to
study targeted change attacks. The following subtasks have been completed:
a) Develop targeted change attacks.
b) Develop an algorithm for attacks based on a speciﬁc goal.
c) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
• Completed: 5a, 5b, 5c
• Remaining: None
• Emad Alsuwat, Hatim Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Cyber at-
tacks against the pc learning algorithm, 2nd International Workshop on A.I. in
Security, 2018, pp. 19 – 35.
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• Emad Alsuwat, Hatim Alsuwat, Marco Valtorta, and Csilla Farkas, Data poi-
soning attacks against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms, Inter-
national Journal of General Systems, 2019, pp. 1-29.
6. Adversarial attacks against the LCD algorithm- the goal of this research task is to use
our link strength measure to evaluate the robustness of the LCD algorithm against
model invalidation attacks. The following subtasks have been completed:
a) Study the LCD algorithm thoroughly.
b) Contact the author of the LCD algorithm to ﬁx the R package for the LCD algo-
rithm.
c) Use our link strength measure to study the robustness of the LCD algorithm.
d) Implement our experiments and establish the results.
• Completed: 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d
• Remaining: None
7. Adversarial Attacks against Bayesian Networks- the goal of this research task is
to deﬁne long-duration data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network structure
learning algorithms The following subtasks have been completed:
a) Develop long-duration data poisoning attacks.
b) Develop an algorithm for the deﬁned attacks.
c) Implement the algorithm and establish the results.
• Completed: 7a, 7b, 7c
• Remaining: None
• Alsuwat, E., Alsuwat, H., Rose, J., Valtorta, M., Farkas, C.: Long duration
data poisoning attacks on Bayesian networks. Tech. rep., University of South
Carolina, SC, USA (2019)
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8. Development of Detection framework for data poisoning attacks against Bayesian
Networks Adversarial Attacks- the aim of this research task is to build a detec-
tive framework for detecting both one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks
against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms. The following subtasks have
been completed:
a) Research the existing defensive methods against data poisoning attacks.
b) Identify a detective method.
c) Build framework
d) Develop algorithms for ﬁrst and second layers of detection.
e) Implement algorithms and establish the results.
• Completed: 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d, 8e
• Remaining: None
• Alsuwat, E., Alsuwat, H., Rose, J., Valtorta, M., Farkas, C.: Long duration
data poisoning attacks on Bayesian networks, The 33rd Annual IFIP WG 11.3
Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy, 2019, pp. 3-22.
1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows:
In chapter 2, we present an overview of background information.
In chapter 3, we present an overview of the proposed system
In chapter 4, we propose a novel link strengths measure between random variables in dis-
crete Bayesian network.
In chapter 5, we identify model invalidation attacks against the PC algorithm.
In chapter 6, we identify targeted change attacks against the PC learning algorithm.
In chapter 7, we use our proposed link strength measure to investigate the robustness of the
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LCD algorithm against such attacks.
In chapter 8, we present long-duration data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network
structure learning algorithms.
In chapter 9, we develop detection framework for the identiﬁed data poisoning attacks
against Bayesian network structure learning algorithms.
Finally, in chapter 10, we conclude and brieﬂy discuss future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 BAYESIAN NETWORKS
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are probabilistic graphical models in which vertices represent
a set of random variables and arcs represent probabilistic dependencies between vertices.
Formally (according to [45]), we say BN = (G,P ) is a Bayesian network, where G =
(V,E) is a direct acyclic graph ( with V = {x1, x2, ..., xn} being the set of random variables
or nodes, andE being the set of edges or arcs) and P is a joint probability distribution of the
random variables, if it satisﬁes the followingMarkov condition: every node is conditionally
independent of its non-descendants given its parents.
The following factorization of the joint probability distribution (also known as global
probability distribution) of V = {x1, x2, ..., xn} into a product of local probability distri-
butions is equivalent to the Markov property for both discrete and continuous variables, as
shown in equation 2.1 and 2.2 respectively [45].
P (V ) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi | parent(xi)) (2.1)
f(V ) =
n∏
i=1
f(xi | parent(xi)) (2.2)
Example 2.1. [Traveling Activity]
Figure 2.1 presents a Bayesian network for a traveling activity. This example shows a
discrete Bayesian network with a domain of ﬁve Boolean variables, which include and are
represented as follows:
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C
D E
Figure 2.1: A simple BN for modeling a traveling activity
1) S – the event that it is summer time;
2) M – the event that the person has money;
3) T – the event that the person is going to travel;
4) H – the event that the person is happy; and
5) P – the even that the person is going to meet new people.
Instead of enumerating the probability distributions of the ﬁve domain variables used
in ﬁgure 2.1 (25 possible combinations), We deﬁne the joint probability distribution of this
Bayesian network as indicated:
P (S,M, T,H, P ) = P (S)× P (M)× P (T | S,M)× P (H | T )× P (P | T )
2.2 THE NOTION OF D-SEPARATION
In a Bayesian network, there are three basic connections among variables as follows [48]:
1. Serial connections (also called pipelined inﬂuences): in a serial connection (shown in
ﬁgure 2.2), changes in the certainty of A will affect the certainty B, which in turn will
affect the uncertainty of C. Therefore this shows information may ﬂow from node A
through B to C, unless there is evidence about B (B is known, or B is instantiated).
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Table 2.1: Conditional probability tables for a simple BN for modeling a traveling activity
M S
True 0.9 True 0.25
T
M False True
S False True False True
True 0.01 0.15 0.3 0.9
H
T False True
True 0.7 0.95
P
T False True
True 0.1 0.8
A
B
C
Figure 2.2: An example of a serial Connection
B
A C
Figure 2.3: An example of a diverging connection
2. Diverging connections: in a diverging connection (shown in ﬁgure 2.3), changes in
the certainty of A will affect the certainty B, which in turn will affect the uncertainty
of C. Therefore this shows information may ﬂow from node A through B to C, unless
there is evidence about B.
3. Converging connections (a.k.a. v-structure): in a converging connection (shown in
ﬁgure 2.4), changes in the certainty of A cannot affect the certainty C through B, and
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BA C
Figure 2.4: An example of a converging connection
vice versa. Therefore this shows information cannot ﬂow between A and C through
B, unless there is evidence about B.
The previously discussed three types of connections in a casual network are used in the
deﬁnition of d-separation [48]:
Deﬁnition 2.2. (d-separation)
Two distinct variables A and B in a causal network are d-separated ("d" for
"directed graph") if for all paths between A and B, there is an intermediate
variable V (distinct from A and B) such that either
• the connection is serial or diverging and V is instantiated, or
• the connection is converging, and neither V nor any of V’s descendants
have received evidence.
2.3 STRUCTURE LEARNING IN BAYESIAN NETWORKS
There are three main approaches to learn the structure of Bayesian networks: constraint-
based, score-based, or hybrid algorithms.
(I) Constraint-based algorithms count on conditional independence tests to determine
the DAG of the learned Bayesian network. The Inductive Causation (IC) algo-
rithm [64] was the ﬁrst constraint-based algorithm, which introduced a framework
for learning the structure of causal models. IC’s framework consists of three steps as
follows:
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(i) Find the skeleton (all pairs of dependent variables)
(ii) Remove indirect dependencies (by deﬁning colliders)
(iii) Complete orienting the remaining undirected edges if any (avoiding cycles).
All constraint-based algorithms, such as the PC algorithm [60, 61] and NPC algo-
rithm [62], follow the theoretical framework introduced by the IC algorithm.
(II) Score-based algorithms, such as AIC [1], BDe [56], K2 [21], and BIC algorithm [27],
assign a score for each Bayesian network structure (this score indicates how well the
Bayesian network structure ﬁts the data) and then perform a (usually greedy) search
algorithm to select the structure with the highest score.
(III) Hybrid algorithms, such as CB [59] and EGS algorithm [22], rely on the idea of using
both constraint-based algorithms and score-based algorithms. The use of constraint-
based algorithms will reduce the search space (i.e., it will reduce the number of
candidate DAGs). Thenceforth, score-based algorithms can be used to select the
optimal DAG.
We will focus on the PC algorithm since it is an integral part of this paper. The PC al-
gorithm (named after the authors, the ﬁrst letter of their ﬁrst names, Peter Spirtes andClark
Glymour) is a constraint-based algorithm for learning the structure of a Bayesian network
from data. The PC algorithm follows the theoretical framework of the IC algorithm to de-
termine the structure of causal models [57, 53]. According to [61], the process performed
by the PC algorithm to learn the structure of Bayesian networks can be summarized as
follows:
(i) For every pair of variables, perform statistical tests for conditional independence.
(ii) Determine the skeleton (undirected graph) of the learned structure by adding a link
between every pair of statistically dependent variables.
18
(iii) Identify colliders (v-structures) of the learned structure (A→ B← C).
(iv) Identify derived directions.
(v) Randomly, complete orienting the remaining undirected edges without creating a new
collider or a cycle.
For the implementation of this paper, we used the Hugin PC algorithm (by HuginTM De-
cision Engine [49, 38]), "which is a variant of the original PC algorithm due to [61]" [29].
2.4 PRIOR TO POSTERIOR UPDATING
Bayes’ theorem is a simple mathematical formula that inverts conditional probabilities (i.e.,
given the conditional probability of eventB given eventA, how to calculate the conditional
probability of event A given event B). The statement of Bayes’ theorem is: For two events
A and B,
P (A | B) = P (B | A)P (A)
P (B) ,
where
(i) P (A | B) is the conditional probability of event A given event B (called the posterior
probability),
(ii) P (B | A) is the conditional probability of event B given event A (called the likeli-
hood),
(iii) P (A) is the marginal probability of event A (called the prior probability), and
(iv) P (B) is the marginal probability of event B (P (B) > 0) [45].
Unlike classical statistics, Bayesian statistics treats parameters as random variables
whereas data is treated as ﬁxed. For Example, let θ be a parameter, and D be a dataset,
then Bayes’ theorem can be expressed mathematically as follows:
P (θ | D) = P (D | θ)P (θ)
P (D) (2.3)
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In equation 2.3, P (θ | D) is the posterior distribution, which is the ultimate goal for
Bayesian statistics since it measures the uncertainty about the parameters θ after seeing the
dataset D. P (D | θ) is the likelihood, which describes how likely the dataset D is if the
truth is parameter θ. P (θ) is the prior distribution, which is a marginal probability of our
belief before seeing data. P (D) is the marginal probability ofD, which is a normalization
constant to ensures that the sum of the posterior distribution sums to 1 over all values of
parameter θ [36]. Thus, since P (D) is constant, we can write Bayes’ theorem in one of the
most useful form in Bayesian update and inference as follows:
P (θ | D) ∝ P (D | θ)× P (θ) (2.4)
Posterior ∝ Likelihood× Prior (2.5)
In Bayesian analysis, the results of the experiment could be used to update the belief
about the parameter θ. In simple cases, we can compute the posterior distribution for the
parameter θ by multiplying the prior distribution and the likelihood function as shown in
equation 2.5. However, it is convenient mathematically for the prior and the likelihood to
be conjugate. A prior distribution is a conjugate prior for the likelihood function if the
posterior distribution belongs to the same distribution as the prior [54]. For example, the
beta distribution is a conjugate prior for the binomial distribution (as a likelihood function)
because the posterior distribution obtained by multiplying the prior and the likelihood be-
longs to the same distribution as the prior (thus, both the prior and the posterior have beta
distributions).
Let’s consider the effect of different priors on the posterior distribution. A completely
uninformative prior is the beta distribution with parameters α = 1 and β = 1. The posterior
distribution in this case is equivalent to the likelihood function since we have a completely
uninformative prior. More informative priors will have a greater inﬂuence on the poste-
rior distribution for a given sample size. On the other hand, larger sample sizes will give
the likelihood function more inﬂuence on the posterior distribution for a given prior dis-
tribution. In practice, this means that we can obtain a precise estimate of the posterior
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distribution using smaller sample sizes when we use more informative priors. Similarly,
we may need larger sample sizes when we use a weak or uninformative prior.
P (θ | D) ∝ Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ) (2.6)
P (θ | D) ∝ Beta(y + α, n− y + β) (2.7)
Equation 2.7 is the formula that we are going to use in this paper for prior to posterior
update. Starting with a prior distribution Beta(α, β), we add the count of successes,y, and
the count of failures, n − y, from the dataset D (where n is total number of entries in D)
to α and β, respectively. Thus, Beta(y + α, n− y + β) is the posterior distribution. For a
theoretical justiﬁcation of the use of the beta distribution to model parameter uncertainty,
see [45].
2.5 LINK STRENGTHS IN BAYESIAN NETWORKS
The concept of link strength in Bayesian networks was introduced ﬁrst by Boerlage in
1992 [18]. In his thesis, Boerlage introduced the concepts of both connection strength
and link strength in a binary Bayesian network model. Connection strength for any two
variables A and B in a Bayesian network model B1 is deﬁned as measuring the strength
between these two variables by testing all possible paths between them in B1, whereas
link strength is deﬁned as measuring the strength these two random variables taking into
account only the direct edge A − B [18]. Methods for link strengths measurements are
not studied sufﬁciently. Imme Ebert-Uphoff in her 2009 paper [24] presented a tutorial
on how to measure connection strengths and link strengths in discrete Bayesian networks.
Ebert-Uphoff concluded that there is a limited literature on link strengths, and there is more
need to apply and use link strengths measures in structure learning and other purposes [24].
However, to the authors’ best knowledge, there are no more recent publications that address
link strengths measurements in discrete Bayesian networks. In this paper, we deﬁne a novel
and not computationally expensive link strengths measure in discrete Bayesian networks.
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2.6 ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
Adversarial machine learning is the research ﬁeld that studies the design of efﬁcient ma-
chine learning algorithms in adversarial environments [28]. Attacks against machine learn-
ing systems have been organized by [11, 10, 28] according to three features: Inﬂuence,
Security Violation, and Speciﬁcity. First, inﬂuence of the attacks on machine learning
models can be either causative or exploratory. Causative attacks aim to corrupt the training
data whereas exploratory attacks aim to corrupt the classiﬁer at test time. Second, security
violation of machine learning models can be a violation of integrity, availability, or privacy.
An integrity violation is an attack that aims to misclassify false positives with the goal of
gaining unauthorized access to the system. An availability violation is an attack that aims
to misclassify both false positives and false negatives and leads to denial of service. A
privacy violation is an attack in which an adversary is able to reap conﬁdential information
from a machine learning model. Third, speciﬁcity of the attacks against machine learning
models can be either targeted, or indiscriminate. Targeted attacks aim to corrupt machine
learning models to misclassify a particular class of false positives whereas indiscriminate
attacks have the goal of misclassifying all false positives.
Evasion attacks [63, 13, 26, 33, 31] and Data poisoning attacks [16, 41, 40, 2] are
two of the most common attacks on machine learning systems [28]. Evasion attacks are
exploratory attacks at the testing phase. In an evasion attack, an adversary attempts to
pollute the data for testing the machine learning classiﬁer; thus causing the classiﬁer to
misclassify adversarial examples as legitimate ones. Data poisoning attacks are causative
attacks, in which an adversary attempts to corrupt the machine learning classiﬁer itself by
contaminating the data on training phase.
In this dissertation, we study the resilience of two commonly used Bayesian network al-
gorithms, namely the PC algorithm and the LCD algorithm, against data poisoning attacks.
Since no study has been performed on evaluating the vulnerabilities of these algorithms
against poisoning attacks, we will just explore the line of data poisoning research on dif-
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ferent machine learning ﬁelds.
There has been a long line of work on poisoning attacks of support vector machines
(SVMs) [16, 66, 67, 47, 42, 19, 32]. In Neural Networks (NNs), there has been a recent
study of data poisoning attacks in which the authors investigated the process of data gener-
ation poisoning and proposed two poisoning methods, including a direct gradient method
and a generative method [69].
2.7 DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES FOR DATA POISONING ATTACKS
In this section, we will give a brief overview of adversarial machine learning research;
focusing on data poisoning. Recent surveys on adversarial machine learning can be found
in [10, 25, 35].
2.7.1 DATA POISONING ATTACKS
As machine learning algorithms have been widely used in security-critical settings such
as spam ﬁltering and intrusion detection, adversarial machine learning has become an
emerging ﬁeld of study. Attacks against machine learning systems have been organized
by [11, 10, 28] according to three features: Inﬂuence, Security Violation, and Speciﬁcity.
Inﬂuence of the attacks on machine learning models can be either causative or exploratory.
Causative attacks aim to corrupt the training data whereas exploratory attacks aim to cor-
rupt the classiﬁer at test time. Security violation of machine learning models can be a
violation of integrity, availability, or privacy. Speciﬁcity of the attacks can be either tar-
geted or indiscriminate. Targeted attacks aim to corrupt machine learning models to mis-
classify a particular class of false positives whereas indiscriminate attacks have the goal of
misclassifying all false positives.
Evasion attacks and Data poisoning attacks are two of the most common attacks on
machine learning systems [28]. Evasion attacks [26, 33, 31] are exploratory attacks at the
testing phase. In an evasion attack, an adversary attempts to pollute the data for testing the
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machine learning classiﬁer; thus causing the classiﬁer to misclassify adversarial examples
as legitimate ones. Data poisoning attacks [40, 2, 16, 42, 32, 69] are causative attacks, in
which adversaries attempt to corrupt the machine learning classiﬁer itself by contaminating
the data in the training phase.
Data poisoning attacks have been studied extensively during the last decade [43, 6, 16,
42, 32, 15, 14, 17, 12, 69]. However, attacks against Bayesian network algorithm have
not been studied. In our previous work, we were addressed data poisoning attacks against
Bayesian network algorithms [8, 9, 6]. We studied how an adversary could corrupt the
Bayesian network structure learning algorithms by inserting contaminated data into the
training phase. We showed how our novel measure of strengths of links for Bayesian net-
works [9] can be used to do a security analysis of attacks against Bayesian network struc-
ture learning algorithms. However, our approach did not consider long-duration attacks.
2.7.2 DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES
Data sanitization is a best practice for security optimization in the adversarial machine
learning context [20]. It is often impossible to validate every data source. In the event of a
poisoning attack, data sanitization adds a layer of protection for training data by removing
contaminated samples from the targeted training data set prior to training a classiﬁer. Reject
on Negative Impact is one of the widely used method for data sanitization [10, 20, 35].
Reject on Negative Impact defense assesses the impact of new training sample additions,
opting to remover or discard samples that yield signiﬁcant, negative effects on the observed
learning outcomes or classiﬁcation accuracy [10, 20]. The base training set is used to
train a classiﬁer, after which, the new training instance is added and a second classiﬁer
is trained [10]. In this approach, classiﬁcation performance is evaluated by comparing
error rates (accuracy) between the original and the new, retrained classiﬁer resulting from
new sample integration [35]. As such, if new classiﬁcation errors are substantially higher
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compared to the original or baseline classiﬁer, it is assumed that the newly added samples
are malicious or contaminated and are therefore removed in order to maximize and protect
classiﬁcation accuracy [10].
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CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
3.1 OVERVIEW OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST BAYESIAN NETWORK
MODELS
Data integrity is a key requirement for correct machine learning applications, such as
Bayesian network structure learning algorithms. In this research, we study how an ad-
versary could corrupt the PC structure learning algorithm. An attacker may attempt to
corrupt the machine learning model by poisoning the input dataset with the ultimate goal
of inﬂuencing the output model. In this research, we propose a threat model to investigate
both attacks that aim to arbitrarily invalidate the learning outcome and attacks that aim
to achieve a speciﬁc goal. We use this threat model to study the resilience of Bayesian
network algorithms, namely the PC algorithm, against data poisoning attacks.
Like all security problems, the problem of adversarial attacks against Bayesian net-
works is to design a security prevention and detection model against these attacks. Our
ongoing work is about developing prevention methods against these deﬁned attacks.
3.2 THREAT MODEL FOR DATA POISONING ATTACKS AGAINST THE PC
ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the general framework of how attackers can use exploratory at-
tacks to corrupt the learned Bayesian model by the PC algorithm. The attacker ﬁrst uses
the PC algorithm to learn the structure of the Bayesian network model. If the learned
structure is what the adversarial opponent wants, then the “poisoned" dataset DB2 is pro-
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duced. Otherwise, the user adds contaminated cases to the learning dataset and relearn the
Bayesian model using the PC algorithm until the desired model is obtained. This process
is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Overview of how data poisoning attacks against Bayesian network structure
learning algorithms work.
In this dissertation, we study the resilience of two of the most commonly used Bayesian
network algorithms, namely the PC algorithm and the LCD algorithm, against data poison-
ing attacks. To the authors’ best knowledge, no study has been performed on evaluating the
vulnerabilities of Bayesian network structure learning algorithms against poisoning attacks.
We present the two subclasses of data poisoning attacks against the Bayesian network al-
gorithms: 1) Model invalidation attacks and 2) Targeted change attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
LINK STRENGTHS FROM DATA IN DISCRETE BAYESIAN
NETWORKS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
We introduce a novel link strengths measure between two random variables in a discrete
Bayesian network model (denoted as L_S). It is essential to not only study the existence
of a link in a causal model but also deﬁne a reliable link strengths measure that is useful
in Bayesian reasoning [18, 24]. The new deﬁned link strengths measure assigns a number
to every link in a Bayesian network model. This number represents the lowest conﬁdence
of all possible combinations of assignments of posterior distributions. The deﬁned link
strengths measure will be used to rank edges from the most to the least believable edge,
rank edges from the weakest to the strongest edge, and justify a plausible process in any
causal model.
4.2 DEFINITION OF THE PROPOSED LINK STRENGTHS MEASURE (L_S)
In this section, we present the deﬁnition of our new link strength measure (we named it
L_S). Our novel approach is as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1. The link strengths measure (L_S) is deﬁned as
L_S(V ariable1 → V ariable2) = min
y∈Y
(pdf( y + α
α + n+ β );α, β, y, n) (4.1)
where Y = {n11, n12, . . . , n1j, n21, n22, . . . , n2j, . . . , ni1, ni2, . . . , nij}, pdf is the proba-
bility density function, and y+α
α+n+β is the mean of the posterior distribution.
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4.3 EXPLANATION
Given a discrete dataset DB1 and a Bayesian network structure B1 learned by the PC
algorithm using DB1, for every link V ariable1 → V ariable2 in B1, build a contingency
table [39] for the two discrete variables V ariable1 and V ariable2 with i and j states,
respectively (as shown in table 4.1).
Table 4.1: A contingency table for two discrete variables V ariable1 and V ariable2 with i
and j states, respectively.
Variable2
Variable1 State1 · · · Statej Observed Row Total
State1 [n11], (e11), < ts11 > · · · [n1j], (e1j), < ts1j > ∑jt=1 n1t
...
... · · · ... ...
Statei [ni1], (ei1), < tsi1 > · · · [nij], (eij), < tsij > ∑jt=1 nit
Observed Column Total
∑i
t=1 nt1 · · ·
∑i
t=1 ntj n (Observed Grand Total)
The above contingency table (Table 4.1) is structured as follows:
1. [nij] is the cell’s observed counts obtained from dataset DB1,
2. (eij) is the cell’s expected counts, calculated as follows:
Observed Row Total× Observed Column Total
Observed Grand Total (denoted as n)
3. < tsij > is the cell’s chi-square test statistic, calculated as follows:
(nij − eij)2
eij
To measure the strength of links of a causal model, we perform the following two steps:
(1) We compute the posterior distributions for each link V ariable1 → V ariable2 as fol-
lows:
P (V ariable2 | V ariable1) = Beta(y + α, n− y + β),
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where V ariable2 | V ariable1 is all possible combinations of discrete states of V ariable2
and V ariable1, and then
(2) We use our link strengths measure as presented in equation 4.1.
Note that y+α
α+n+β in equation 4.1 is obtained by simply substituting α with y+α and β with
n− y + β in α
α+β .
4.4 INTERPRETATION
For any two random variables in a causal model (V ariable1 with i states and V ariable2
with j states), there are i × j combinations of assignments of posterior distributions. For
every posterior distribution, we have a prior distribution that is a conjugate prior for the
likelihood function. For instance, a posterior distribution in the form Beta(y + α, n− y +
β) has a Beta-distributed prior, Beta(α, β), which is a conjugate prior for the likelihood
function, Binomial(n, θ). Considering all i× j posterior distributions for the two random
V ariable1 and V ariable2, we can measure the uncertainty of that link by measuring how
peaked the posterior distributions (Beta distributions in our experiments) are; thus, we can
identify the link strength based on the uncertainty level. The more peaked the posterior
distribution is, the more certainty we have about the posterior distribution probability. The
peak of a beta distribution,Beta(α′, β′), is reached at its mean, α′
α′+β′ . Thus, the peak of the
posterior distribution is reached at y−α
n−y+β . In the deﬁned link strengths measure, we deﬁne
the link strength for any link between two random variables in a causal model as the value
of the smallest peak. This point is the point at which the model has seen the fewest number
of cases; thus, it is the most critical point through which this link can be manipulated.
4.5 PRACTICAL USAGES
We use this measure to identify weak edges (i.e., low values of L_S). These edges are the
easiest to remove from a given causal model. We also use the L_S value to identify location
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Table 4.2: Posterior distributions for the Chest Clinic Network.
Link Posterior Distributions (Beta Distributions)
P(T | A) Beta(10,99) Beta(106,9789) Beta(99,10) Beta(9789,106)
P(L | S) Beta(481,4510) Beta(47,4966) Beta(4510,481) Beta(4966,47)
P(B | S) Beta(3019,1972) Beta(1514,3899) Beta(1972,3019) Beta(3899,1514)
P(E | T) Beta(115,1) Beta(523,9365) Beta(1,115) Beta(9365,523)
P(E | L) Beta(527,1) Beta(111,9365) Beta(1,527) Beta(9365,111)
P(D | B) Beta(3638,895) Beta(725,4746) Beta(895,3638) Beta(4746,725)
P(D | E) Beta(520,118) Beta(3843,5523) Beta(118,520) Beta(5523,3843)
P(X | E) Beta(624,14) Beta(454,8912) Beta(14,624) Beta(8912,454)
for new edges to be added. We claim that the highest L_S value, the most believable the
new edge is.
4.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we will evaluate the proposed link strength measure (L_S) on the original
Chest Clinic Network. Given the Chest Clinic network model as shown in Figure 1.3 and
the dataset DB1, we followed the two steps presented in section 4.
Table 4.2 contains the posterior distributions (Beta Distributions) calculated in step 1
as follows:
Figure 4.1 shows the ﬁnal link strength evaluation (L_S) which is calculated in step 2
as follows:
We observe that the edge T → A is the weakest edge in Chest Clinic network with the
score 14.75256. Also, we can see that the edgeE → D is the second weakest edge with the
score 25.73502 and so on. The strongest edge in Chest Clinic network is the edge L → E
with the score 129.2983.
4.7 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS LINK STRENGTH MEASURES
In this section, we will compare our link strength measure (L_S) with Mutual Information
link strengths measure. Shannon in [58] introduced the concept of Mutual Information
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Figure 4.1: Results of L_S on the Chest Clinic Network.
(MI) in the context of communication theory and Pearl in [52] proposed its expanded use
to measure connection strength in Bayesian Networks; it is deﬁned as:
MI(X,Y ) =
∑
x,y
P (x, y)log2(
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)) (4.2)
MI measures the how edge in a causal model are related to each others by (1) detecting any
sort of relationship and (2) employing straightforward interpretation of the amount of data
shared between the datasets (3) while remaining insensitive to dataset size, as characteristic
of p-value testing [55]. This simpliﬁed MI calculation reﬂects and measures connection
strength between X and Y based on the degree or strength of inﬂuence the state of X
affects the state of Y through the comparison of U(Y ) and U(Y |X). Put another way,
the MI formula seeks to determine the amount of uncertainty in Y that can be reduced
by knowledge of state of X if nothing else is known [24]. Therefore, the MI between
two datasets (X and Y ) is typically estimated from statistical analysis of the (x, y) pairs
between the two datasets [55].
The following table (Table 4.3) presents the results of using our link strength (L_S) and
MI link strength to compute strengths of links of the Chest Clink Network. Note that, we
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rank the edge in the column rank from the weakest to the strongest edge. For more technical
details about how to use MI link strength measure, we refer the reader to Appendix C.
Table 4.3: Using L_S and MI to compute link strength of the original Chest Clinic Network
Link
Our Link strength Measure
L_S
Mutual Information
MI
Score Rank Score Rank
A→ T 14.75256 1 0.0006 1
S → L 50.30727 4 0.0303485 4
S → B 56.88552 5 0.06665 5
T → E 103.7509 7 0.0296 3
L→ E 129.2983 8 0.2675 7
E → D 25.73502 2 0.02575 2
B → D 49.30178 3 0.3508 8
E → X 70.69412 6 0.2236 6
Both link strengths measures agree on the fact that the edge A → T is the weakest
link in the Chest Clinic Network. However, our link strength measure functions better
since it is able to identify the deterministic edges. That is, deterministic edges T → E
and L → E are hard edges to break. In addition, MI measure computes the link strength
measure using the conditional probability tables whereas our link strength measure uses a
given dataset to compute the strengths of links, which makes our link strength efﬁcient for
security application as it is sensitive to changes in data.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS
5.1 OVERVIEW OF MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS
A model invalidation attack against the PC algorithm is a malicious active attack in which
adversarial opponents try to corrupt the original model in any way. We demonstrate ad-
versarial attacks to decrease the validation status of the model using the least number of
changes.
In such an event, adversaries create some formal disturbance in the model. For example,
they will try to add imprecise or incorrect data to change the model validation status so that
the model is rendered invalid. We distinguish between two ways to invalidate Bayesian
network models:
1) Attacks based on the notion of d-separation and
2) Attacks based on marginal independence tests.
In what follows, we present an item list and short description for all the algorithms that
are going to be presented in this chapter of the dissertation:
Algorithm Description
Algorithm 1 Creating a New Converging Connection
Algorithm 2 Breaking an Existing Converging Connection
Algorithm 3 Edge Deleting
Algorithm 4 Removing a Weak Edge
Algorithm 5 Edge adding
Algorithm 6 Adding the Most Believable yet Incorrect Edge
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5.2 MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON THE NOTION OF D-SEPARATION
Based on the deﬁnition of d-separation, adversaries may attempt to introduce a new link in
any triple (A−B −C) in the BN model. This newly inserted link (A−C) will introduce
a v-structure in the Bayesian model, thus change the independence relations.
Theorem 5.1. Let B1 and B2 be two Markov equivalent BNs, and let < A,B,C > be
a path in B1. If a new link is added to B1 creating B′1, then B
′
1 and B2 are not Markov
equivalent.
B
A C
(a) Adding the dashed link to the serial connection.
B
A C
(b) Adding one of the dashed links to the diverging connection.
B
A C
(c) Adding one of the dashed links and shielding collider B.
Figure 5.1: Three cases for the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof Sketch. Adding a new edge to the path < A,B,C > in Bayesian network model B1
affects the Markov equivalence class of B1 (two Bayesian networks areMarkov equivalent
if and only if they have the same skeleton and the same v-structures (unshielded collid-
ers) [3]). Any sound learning algorithm will try to avoid the occurrence of a cycle; thus, in
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the triple (A−B −C), either an existing collider is shielded, and a new link is introduced
(as shown in Figure 5.1c) or a new link is added (as shown in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b). In
either case, the Markov equivalence class of B1 will be violated.
Within model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation, we can further
identify two subclasses:
5.2.1 CREATING A NEW CONVERGING CONNECTION (V-STRUCTURE)
Adversarial attackers can corrupt Bayesian network models by introducing a new converg-
ing connection. Adversaries will attempt to poison the learning dataset with the goal of
introducing a new v-structure by adding a new link to any serial or diverging connection in
Bayesian network models. Adding such an edge will not only introduce a new collider but
also change the equivalence class of the learned Bayesian network model.
Theorem 5.2. Let B1 be a Bayesian network model, and let < A,B,C > be a path in B1
with either a serial connection or diverging connection, then introducing a new edge on
the path < A,B,C > must create a new converging connection in B1.
Proof Sketch. Trivially follows. [See ﬁgures 5.1a and 5.1b].
We have developed Algorithm 1 to test the resilience of the PC learning algorithm
against this type of attacks. It checks the feasibility of poisoning a given dataset DB1 with
the ultimate goal of introducing a new converging connection (v-structure) in the learned
Bayesian network model from DB1.
Let n be the number of cases in DB1, and let β be data poisoning rate at which we
are allowed to add new “contaminated" cases to DB1 (we default set β ≤ 0.05); Algo-
rithm 1 presents algorithmic details of data poisoning attacks that aim to introduce a new
v-structure in a Bayesian model as follows:
Algorithm 1 starts by learning the structure of the Bayesian network model B1 from
dataset DB1. The poisoned dataset DB2 is initialized to DB1. Then the algorithm tests
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Algorithm 1: Creating a New Converging Connection Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure New Converging Connection(DB1)
2 Use the PC algorithm for learning the structure of Bayesian network model B1
from dataset DB1 (using the default signiﬁcance level at 0.05 [38]);
3 Let DB2 = DB1;
4 for Every serial or diverging connection triple (A−B − C) in B1 where A
and C are d-connected by B do
5 Construct the i× j the contingency table for variables A and C;
6 forK = 1, 2, ..., β × n ◃ where β × n is the maximum number of
contaminated tuples to be added to DB1 do
7 In the contingency table for the link A− C, determine the cell that has
the highest test statistics value (cellij);
8 DB2 for adding the link A− C = DB2 + d ◃ where d is an instance in
which A = state i, C = state j, and all other variables in d are No;
9 Run the PC algorithm on DB2 to learn the structure of the Bayesian
network;
10 if There is a new edge between vertex A and C then
11 Return BD2 ;
12 Let DB2 = DB1;
13 Continue to test the next triple;
14 end
15 if K = β × n then
16 Return msg "Failed to introduce the link A− C within a feasible
number of cases" ;
17 Let DB2 = DB1;
18 Continue to test the next triple;
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 end
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every serial and diverging triple (A−B−C) in B1 for the feasibility of adding a new link
to that triple (this is accomplished by adding case-by-case to the attack dataset DB2, and
then applying the PC algorithm every time a new case is added to DB2).
Algorithm 1 tests the feasibility of adding new links to every serial and diverging con-
nections in B1. For each serial and diverging triple in B1, the algorithm terminates if it
succeeds in adding a new link or just prints a failure message if the number of added cases
is more than β × n. Our empirical results are given in section 5.4.
5.2.2 BREAKING AN EXISTING CONVERGING CONNECTION (V-STRUCTURE)
Adversaries can exploit Bayesian network models by breaking an existing converging con-
nection. The PC algorithm starts by identifying unshielded colliders (v-structure with un-
married parents) when learning the Bayesian network structure from data [61]; therefore,
attacking v-structures will make a signiﬁcant corruption to the learned BN structures since
the learned model will have a different equivalence class than the expected one. Such an
adversarial attack can be done by marrying the parents of an unshielded collider. Note that,
if vertex B is an unshielded collider on the path < A, B, C >, then A and C are inde-
pendent unconditionally, but are dependent conditionally on B in most cases (faithfulness
assumption [61]).
Theorem 5.3. Let B1 be a Bayesian network model, and let B be an unshielded collider
on the path < A,B,C >, then introducing a new edge on the path < A,B,C > must
break the existing converging unshielded connection at vertex B.
Proof Sketch. Trivially follows. [See ﬁgure 5.1c].
We have developed Algorithm 2 to check the robustness of the PC algorithm against
the feasibility of shielding an existing converging connection. Given a dataset DB1, Algo-
rithm 2 tests the feasibility of shielding an existing converging connection.
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Let n be the number of cases in DB1, and let β be data poisoning rate at which we
are allowed to add new “poisoned" cases to DB1 (we default set β ≤ 0.05); Algorithm 2
presents the following algorithmic details of data poisoning attacks that aim to check the
feasibility of breaking an existing unshielded collider:
Algorithm 2: Breaking an Existing Converging Connection Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Breaking a Converging Connection(DB1)
2 Use the PC algorithm for learning the structure of Bayesian network model B1
from dataset DB1 (using the default signiﬁcance level at 0.05 [38]);
3 Let DB2 = DB1;
4 for Every converging connection triple (A−B − C) in B1 where A and C are
d-separated by B do
5 Construct the i× j the contingency table for variables A and C;
6 forK = 1, 2, ..., β × n ◃ where β × n is the maximum number of
contaminated tuples to be added to DB1 do
7 In the contingency table for the link A− C, determine the cell that has
the highest test statistics value (cellij);
8 DB2 for adding the link A− C = DB2 + d ◃ where d is an instance in
which A = state i, C = state j, and all other variables in d are No;
9 Run the PC algorithm on DB2 to learn the structure of the Bayesian
network;
10 if There is a new edge between vertex A and C then
11 Return BD2 ;
12 Let DB2 = DB1;
13 Continue to test the next triple;
14 end
15 if K = β × n then
16 Return msg "Failed to introduce the link A− C within a feasible
number of cases" ;
17 Let DB2 = DB1;
18 Continue to test the next triple;
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 end
Algorithm 2 starts by learning the structure of the Bayesian network model B1 from
dataset DB1. The poisoned dataset DB2 is initialized to DB1. Then the algorithm tests
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every converging triple (A−B−C) in B1 for the feasibility of adding a new link to shield
that triple (the poisoning attack is conducted by adding case by case to the attack dataset
DB2, and applying the PC algorithm every time a new case is added to DB2).
Algorithm 2 tests the feasibility of adding a new link to every converging connection in
B1. For each converging triple in B1, the algorithm terminates if it succeeds in shielding
a collider or just prints a failure message when the number of added cases is more than
β × n. Our empirical results are presented in section 5.4.
5.3 MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON MARGINAL INDEPENDENCE TESTS
When learning the structure of a Bayesian network model from data, the PC algorithm starts
by analyzing the conditional independence statements between variables. It performs χ2
statistical test on the given dataset to establish the set of statistical independence statements
for the learned causal model [48]. Using this information of how the PC algorithm works,
adversarial attackers may contaminate the input dataset with the goal of removing weak
edges or adding the most believable yet incorrect links. Based on the direct impact of
marginal independence tests on the PC algorithm, model invalidation attacks can be divided
into two main types:
1) removing weak edges, and
2) adding the most believable yet incorrect edge.
5.3.1 FEASIBILITY OF DELETING AN EDGE FROM A CAUSAL MODEL
Before we deﬁne attacks based on removing weak edges, we need to deﬁne a new algorithm
(Algorithm 3) for checking the feasibility for deleting an edge from a given causal model.
Given a dataset, DB1, a Bayesian network model, B1, where B1 is the result of the
learned causal model when given DB1 as an input to the PC learning algorithm, and a
contingency table for two random variables in B1 (variable1 with i states and variable2
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with j states), we introduce Algorithm 3 which checks the feasibility of deleting an existing
edge in a causal model.
Let n be the number of cases in DB1, and let β be data poisoning rate at which we are
allowed to edit or “contaminate" DB1 (we default set β ≤ 0.05); algorithm 3 presents al-
gorithmic details of data poisoning attacks that aim to delete an existing edge in a Bayesian
network model as follows:
Algorithm 3: Edge Deleting Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Edge Deleting(DB1, B1, A− C)
2 Construct the i× j the contingency table for variable A and variable C from
DB1;
3 Let DB2 = DB1;
4 forK = 1, 2, ..., β × n ◃ where β × n is the maximum number of
contaminated tuples to be added to DB1 do
5 In the contingency table for the link A− C, determine the cell that has the
highest test statistics value (cellij) and the cell that has the smallest test
statistics value(celli′j′);
6 DB2 for deleting the link A− C = DB′2 ◃ where DB′2 is the old DB2
expect an instance is transferred from ij state to i′j′ state;
7 Run the PC algorithm on DB2 to learn the structure of the Bayesian
network model;
8 if There is no edge between vertex A and vertex C then
9 Return BD2;
10 end
11 if K = β × n then
12 Return msg "Failed to introduce the link A− C within a feasible
number of cases" ;
13 end
14 Update the i× j the contingency table for variable A and variable C
from DB2;
15 end
16 end
Algorithm 3 starts by constructing the contingency table for variables A and C. The
contingency table in algorithm 3 is needed to accelerate the process of removing an edge
from a Bayesian model. That is, moving cases from the cell with the highest test statistics
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value to the cell with the lowest test statistics value will signiﬁcantly accelerate the edge
deletion process. The poisoning attack in this algorithm is performed by modifying case
by case in the poisoned datasetDB2, and then applying the PC algorithm every time a case
is modiﬁed in DB2.
Algorithm 3 returns a dataset DB2 if deleting the edge A− C is feasible; otherwise, a
failure message will be printed since the number of added cases will be more than β × n.
5.3.2 REMOVING A WEAK EDGE
We show that it is feasible to use link strengths measure to identify and rank the edges on a
causal model from the weakest to the strongest. Thus, adversarial opponents may attempt
to poison the learning dataset with the goal of removing weak edges.
We have developed Algorithm 4 to check the resilience of the PC algorithm against
attacks that target weak edges.
Let DB1 be an input dataset, and let n be the number of cases in DB1, Algorithm 4
provides algorithmic details of data poisoning attacks that aim to delete the weakest edge
in a Bayesian model as follows:
Algorithm 4: Removing a Weak Edge Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Removing a Weak Edge(DB1)
2 Use the PC algorithm for learning the structure of Bayesian network model B1
from dataset DB1 (using the default signiﬁcance level at 0.05 [38]);
3 Use L_S to rank the edges of B1 from the weakest to the strongest;
4 Let A− C be the weakest edge to be deleted from B1;
5 Test the feasibility of deleting the edge A− C from B1 using Algorithm 3;
6 if Algorithm 3 returns DB2 then
7 Return DB2;
8 else
9 Return msg “Algorithm 3 failed to delete the link A− C within a feasible
number of cases";
10 end
11 end
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Algorithm 4 starts by learning the structure of the Bayesian network model B1 from
dataset DB1. It then calculates the strength of each link in the model B1 and rank them
from the weakest to the strongest edge. After that, Algorithm 4 checks the robustness
of the PC algorithm against the feasibility of deleting the weakest edge in B1 by calling
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 4 returns a contaminated dataset DB2 if deleting the weakest edge is feasi-
ble; otherwise, a failure message is printed since the number of added cases is more than
β × n. Our empirical results are presented in section 5.5.
5.3.3 FEASIBILITY OF ADDING AN EDGE TO A CAUSAL MODEL
Before we deﬁne attacks based on adding the most believable yet incorrect edge, we need
to deﬁne a new algorithm (Algorithm 5) for checking the feasibility for deleting an edge
from a given causal model.
We have presented Algorithms 1 and 2 in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, receptively. Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 check the feasibility of introducing a new link in a given Bayesian network
triple (A−B−C). In this section, given a datasetDB1, a model B1, which is the result of
feeding DB1 to the PC algorithm, we introduce Algorithm 5 which checks the feasibility
of adding a link between two nodes that do not lie in a triple in a Bayesian network model.
Let n be the number of cases in DB1, and let β be data poisoning rate at which we
are allowed to “poison" DB1 (we default set β ≤ 0.05); algorithm 5 presents algorithmic
details of data poisoning attacks that aim to introduce a link between two vertices that do
not lie in a triple in a Bayesian network model as follows:
Algorithm 5 starts by constructing the contingency table for variables A and C. The
use of the contingency table in this algorithm will accelerate the process of adding a new
edge between two nodes that do not lie in a triple in a Bayesian network model. That is,
adding more observed cases to the cell with the highest test statistics value will dramatically
accelerate the process of adding a link to a causal model. The data poisoning attack in this
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Algorithm 5: Edge adding Procedure
Input : 1) Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases.
2) A Bayesian network model B1 ◃ B1 is the of the resulted model when
given DB1 as an input to the PC algorithm
3) The link A− C ◃ The link we intend to add to B1
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Edge Adding(DB1, B1, A− C)
2 Construct the i× j the contingency table for variable A and variable C;
3 Let DB2 = DB1;
4 for < K = 1, 2, ..., β × n > ◃ β × n is the maximum number of poisoned
tuples to be added to DB1 do
5 In the contingency table for the link A− C, determine the cell that has the
highest test statistics value (cellij);
6 DB2 for the link AC = DB2 + d ◃ where d is an instance in which
A = state i, C = state j, and all other variables in d are No;
7 Run the PC algorithm on DB2 to learn the structure of the Bayesian
network model;
8 if There is a new edge between vertex A and vertex C then
9 Return BD2.
10 end
11 if K = β × n then
12 Return msg "Failed to introduce the link A− C within a feasible
number of cases"
13 end
14 end
15 end
algorithm is performed by adding case by case to the poisoned dataset DB2, and then
applying the PC algorithm every time a new case is added to DB2.
Algorithm 5 terminates by either returning the poisoned dataset DB2 if deleting the
edge A − C is feasible or by returning a failure message since the number of added cases
will be more than β × n.
5.3.4 ADDING THE MOST BELIEVABLE YET INCORRECT EDGE
We show that it is feasible to use link strengths measure to identify and rank the edges on a
causal model from the most to the least believable edge. Thus, adversaries can cleverly use
data poisoning attacks craft the input dataset to the Bayesian network model so that adding
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those incorrect yet plausible edges is viable.
We have developed Algorithm 6 to check the robustness of the PC algorithm against
this attack.
Let DB1 be an input dataset, and let n be the number of cases in DB1, Algorithm 6
provides algorithmic details of data poisoning attacks that aim to add the most believable
link to a Bayesian model as follows:
Algorithm 6: Adding the Most Believable yet Incorrect Edge Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Adding the Most Believable yet Incorrect
Edge(DB1)
2 Use the PC algorithm for learning the structure of Bayesian network model B1
from dataset DB1 (using the default signiﬁcance level at 0.05 [38]);
3 Choose a set of edge Q that could be added to B1;
4 Use L_S to rank the set of edges Q from the most to the least believable edge;
5 Let A− C be the most believable edge to be added to B1;
6 if A− C lies in a a serial or diverging triple A−B − C then
7 Use Algorithm 1 to check the feasibility of adding the link A− C;
8 if Algorithm 1 returns DB2 then
9 Return DB2;
10 else
11 Return msg “Algorithm 1 failed to introduce the link A− C" ;
12 end
13 else if A− C lies in a converging triple A→ B ← C then
14 Use Algorithm 2 to check the feasibility of adding the link A− C;
15 if Algorithm 2 returns DB2 then
16 Return DB2;
17 else
18 Return msg “Algorithm 2 failed to introduce the link A− C"
19 end
20 else
21 Use Algorithm 5 to check the feasibility of adding the link A− C;
22 if Algorithm 5 returns DB2 then
23 Return DB2
24 else
25 Return msg “Algorithm 5 failed to introduce the link A− C"
26 end
27 end
28 end
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Algorithm 6 starts by learning the structure of the Bayesian network model B1 from
dataset DB1. It then asks the user to choose the set of edges that could be added to B1.
Algorithm 6 then uses link strengths measures to rank the set of edges Q from the most to
the least believable edge. Let the most believable edge to be added to B1 be A− C. If the
link A−C introduces a new v-structure in a triple A−B −C, then Algorithm 1 is called.
On the hand, if the link A−C shield a collider B in a triple A−B −C, then Algorithm 2
is called. Otherwise, Algorithm 5 is called to add a link between two vertices that do not
lie in a triple in a Bayesian network model.
In all different scenarios, Algorithm 6 returns a contaminated datasetDB2 if adding the
most believable edge is feasible; otherwise, a failure message is printed since the number
of added cases will be more than β × n. Our empirical results are presented in section 5.5.
5.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON THE
NOTION OF D-SEPARATION
In this experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of model invalidation attacks based on
the notion of d-separation (section 5.2) to poison the Chest Clinic Network dataset DB1.
Our aim is to introduce a new v-structure. That is,
1) add the links D − S, B − L and S − E to the serial connections D → B → S,
B → S → L and S → L→ E, respectively, and
2) add the link A− E to the diverging connection A← T → E.
We also study the robustness of the PC learning algorithm against the attacks aiming to
break an existing v-structure, i.e., to shield the collider T → E ← L.
We present our results in Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. We succeeded to invalidate
(change the Markov equivalence class) the model learned by the PC algorithm. We had to
introduce 74 corrupt cases (data items) to introduce the link D − S. To introduce links
B − L, S − E, and A − E required 13, 40, and 3 corrupt cases, respectively. To shield
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Figure 5.2: Introducing a new converging connection in the triple D −B − S.
the collider E, we only needed 8 poisoning data items. In addition, when we increased the
number of corrupted data items, the PC learning algorithm was acting unstably. Our results
after adding 17 poising cases to introduce the malicious link T − L is in Figure 5.7.
We also observed that the choice of corrupt data items affects the efﬁciency of the
attack. That is, when introducing a malicious link between two random variables, a cell
with a higher test statistics value < tsij > in the contingency table of these two random
variables requires fewer corrupt data items than a cell with a lower test statistics value. For
example, when poisoning dataset DB1 to add the link D − S, we needed more corrupt
data items as the value of test statistics got lower. The results are as follows: the cell with
D = yes and S = yes required 74 cases, the cell with D = yes and S = no required 272
cases, the cell with D = no and S = yes required 1120 cases, and the cell with D = no
and S = no required 1701 cases. Overall, we showed that the PC algorithm is vulnerable
to model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation.
5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON
MARGINAL INDEPENDENCE TESTS
Link strength measure (L_S) is needed for the second experiment. Given B1 model as
shown in Figure 1.4 and the datasetDB1, we followed the two steps presented in section 4.
Table 5.1 contains the posterior distributions calculated in step 1. Figure 5.8 shows the
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Figure 5.3: Introducing a new converging connection in the triple B − S − L.
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Figure 5.4: Introducing a new converging connection in the triple S − L− E.
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Figure 5.5: Introducing a new converging connection in the triple A− T − E.
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Figure 5.6: Breaking an existing converging connection in the triple T − E − L.
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Figure 5.7: The result of using 17 cases to break the v-structure T → E ← L.
Table 5.1: Posterior distributions for the Chest Clinic Network.
Link Posterior Distributions (Beta Distributions)
P(T | A) Beta(10,99) Beta(106,9789) Beta(99,10) Beta(9789,106)
P(L | S) Beta(481,4510) Beta(47,4966) Beta(4510,481) Beta(4966,47)
P(B | S) Beta(3019,1972) Beta(1514,3899) Beta(1972,3019) Beta(3899,1514)
P(E | T) Beta(115,1) Beta(523,9365) Beta(1,115) Beta(9365,523)
P(E | L) Beta(527,1) Beta(111,9365) Beta(1,527) Beta(9365,111)
P(D | B) Beta(3638,895) Beta(725,4746) Beta(895,3638) Beta(4746,725)
ﬁnal link strength evaluation (L_S), calculated in step 2.
We will use these strength measures in this section and in section 6.2 to illustrate the
ease of removing existing links and adding links to a causal model.
In this experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of model invalidation attacks based
on marginal independence tests (section 5.3) to poison the Chest Clinic Network dataset
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14.75256 50.30727 56.88552
129.2983103.7509
49.30178
Figure 5.8: Results of L_S on the learned model by the PC algorithm B1.
DB1. In this experiment, we check the resilience of the PC algorithm against the feasibility
of deleting the weakest edge in the Bayesian model B1. To determine the weakest edge in
B1, we do the following:
1) use the deﬁned link strength measure L_S to rank the edges of B1 from the weakest to
the strongest edge, and
2) check the feasibility of poisoning dataset DB1 to remove the weakest edge.
We also study the robustness of the PC algorithm against attacks aiming to add the most
believable yet incorrect edge to B1. To determine the most believable edge to be added to
B1, we do the following:
1) determine the set of edges Q that could be added to the model B1 (in this experiment,
we let Q = {A− S, T − S,D − S, L−B,L− T}),
2) use the deﬁned link strength measure to rank the set of edges Q from the most to the
least believable edge, and
3) check the feasibility of poisoning dataset DB1 to add the most believable edge.
We present our results of deleting the weakest edge fromB1 in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.9.
We succeeded to invalidate the model learned by the PC algorithm. We had to modify only
3 cases to break the weakest link A− T . Our results of adding the most believable edge to
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Table 5.2: The result of using L_S to rank B1 edges from the weakest to the strongest.
Link Link Strength L_S Rank
A→ T 14.75256 1
S → L 50.30727 3
S → B 56.88552 4
T → E 103.7509 5
L→ E 129.2983 6
B → D 49.30178 2
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Figure 5.9: The result of removing the weakest link in B1, A→ T
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Figure 5.10: The result of adding the most believable link to B1, B → L.
B1 are presented in Tables 5.3, 5.4, and Figure 5.10. We succeeded to fool the PC algorithm
and invalidate the learned model. We had to introduce only 13 corrupt data items to add
the most believable link B − L.
We observed that when removing an edge from a causal model, the choice of corrupt
data items has an impact on the efﬁciency of the attack. That is, transferring data items from
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Table 5.3: Posterior distributions for the set of edges Q.
Link Posterior Distributions (Beta Distributions)
P(S | A) Beta(57, 52) Beta(4934, 4961) Beta(57, 52) Beta(4934, 4961)
P(T | S) Beta(49, 4942) Beta(67, 4946) Beta(49, 4942) Beta(67, 4946)
P(D | S) Beta(2728, 2263) Beta(1635, 3378) Beta(2728, 2263) Beta(1635, 3378)
P(L | B) Beta(312, 4221) Beta(216, 5255) Beta(312, 4221) Beta(216, 5255)
P(L | T) Beta(5, 111) Beta(523, 9365) Beta(5, 111) Beta(523, 9365)
Table 5.4: L_S results.
Link {Link strength L_S} Rank
A→ S 8.313748 5
S → T 28.66903 3
S → D 54.90557 2
B → L 91.51039 1
T → L 21.92398 4
the cell with the highest test statistics value to the cell with the lowest test statistics value
in a contingency table of two random variables will accelerate the process of removing
the link between them. Overall, we showed that the PC algorithm is vulnerable to model
invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests.
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CHAPTER 6
TARGETED CHANGE ATTACKS
6.1 OVERVIEW OF TARGETED CHANGE ATTACKS
A targeted change attack against the PC algorithm is an active malicious attack in which
malicious agents try to move from the state of "what I have" to the state of "what I want"
by poisoning the learning dataset. Adversaries attempt to plan attacks against Bayesian
network models using the least number of changes. That is, they will attempt to move
from the existing model to the desired model using the least and inconspicuous number
of changes. As such, adversaries assess the difﬁculty of entering or modifying data that
promises to intentionally change the current model into the desired model. By doing so,
the adversary is able to make the changed model behave exactly as they want.
A targeted change attack is more harmful and sophisticated than model invalidation
attack. For this, adversaries attempt to poison the input dataset aiming for a speciﬁc re-
sult of the BN model; therefore, it misclassiﬁes a certain class of false positives and false
negatives.
Let DB1 be an input dataset to the PC learning algorithm, and let n be the number of
cases in DB1, Algorithm 7 provides algorithmic details of targeted data poisoning attacks
that aim to implement a complete attacking scenario against a given Bayesian model as
follows:
Algorithm 7 starts by learning the structure of the Bayesian network model B1 from
dataset DB1. It then uses the deﬁned link strengths measure to rank the edges of B1 from
the weakest to the strongest edge. A malicious user can enter the set of edges Q that the
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Algorithm 7: Targeted Change Attacks Procedure
Input : Dataset DB1 ◃ Original dataset with n cases
Output: Contaminated dataset DB2 or a failure message
1 Procedure Targeted Change Attacks(DB1)
2 Use the PC algorithm for learning the structure of Bayesian network model B1
from dataset DB1 (setting the signiﬁcance of the Hugin PC to the default
level, which is 0.05 [38]);
3 Use L_S to rank the edges of B1 from the weakest to the strongest edge;
4 Choose a set of edge Q that could be added to B1;
5 Use L_S to rank the set of edges Q from the most to the least believable edge;
6 Plan a targeted attack (the set of edges to be added or deleted from B1);
7 repeat
8 if there is a need to introduce a new link in B1 then
9 Use Algorithm 1 to introduce a new v-structure, Algorithm 2 to break
an existing collider, or Algorithm 5 to add a link between two vertices
that do not lie in a triple;
10 end
11 if there is a need to delete an existing link then
12 Use Algorithm 3;
13 end
14 if there is a need to remove the weakest edge then
15 Use Algorithm 4;
16 end
17 if there is a need to add the most believable edge then
18 Use Algorithm 6;
19 end
20 until the targeted attack is achieved;
21 end
user wants add to the model B1. The deﬁned link strength measure is used to rank the set
of edge Q from the most to the least believable edge.
The malicious user then plans a targeted change attack. The adversary in this case
chooses the set of edges that could be added to or deleted from the causal model B1. For
example, an attacker may think it is feasible to achieve his goal by adding a new plausible
link and deleting an existing one.
If the attacker wants to add a new link A − C and this new link introduces a new v-
structure in a triple A−B −C, then Algorithm 1 is called. On the hand, if the link A−C
shield a colliderB in a tripleA−B−C, then Algorithm 2 is called. Otherwise, Algorithm 5
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is called to add a link between two vertices that do not lie in a triple in a Bayesian network
model.
If the attacker wants to delete an existing edge. There are two algorithms that can
check the feasibility of achieving this goal. Algorithm 3 checks the feasibility of deleting
any edge in a Bayesian network model, and Algorithm 4 checks the feasibility of deleting
the weakest edge in a Bayesian network model.
In all different scenarios, Algorithm 7 returns a contaminated dataset DB2 if achieving
the targeted attack is feasible; otherwise, a failure message will be printed if the number
of added cases will be more than β × n, where β is data poisoning rate at which we are
allowed to add new “poisoned" cases to DB1 (we default set β ≤ 0.05)
6.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR TARGETED CHANGE ATTACKS
A further goal of this research is to study the inﬂuence of targeted change attacks on our
dataset DB1. We validate the effectiveness of targeted change attacks described in Al-
gorithm 7 (section 6) to poison the Chest Clinic network dataset DB1 with the goal of
achieving a particular change to the model. Algorithm 7 checks the robustness of the PC
algorithm against the feasibility of implementing a targeted change attack.
Given the link strength measure L_S for ranking the edges of the model B1 from the
weakest to the strongest edge (Table 5.2) and given L_S for ranking the set of edgesQ that
could be added to the model B1 from the most to the least believable edge (Table 5.4), we
aim to achieve the following targeted attack against the model B1:
Change the model B1 such that it concludes that smoking (S) causes dyspnoea (D) but not
lunge cancer(L).
Our attack had the following two steps (see Figure 6.1):
1) use Algorithm 7 to delete the link S → L, and then
2) use Algorithm 7 again to add the link S → D.
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We present our results in Figures 6.2, and 6.3. We observed that Algorithm 7 succeeded
to delete the link S → L by modifying only 114 data items in our dataset DB1, resulting
in a dataset DB2 (Figure 6.2). Then we fed DB2 to Algorithm 7 succeeded to add the
link D → S. We needed only 74 cases to introduce the link D → S in dataset DB2
(Figure 6.3). Overall, we showed that the PC algorithm is vulnerable to targeted change
attacks.
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1) delete this link
2) add this link
Figure 6.1: A targeted attack against model B1
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Figure 6.2: The model B1 after achieving step 1 (deleting S → L)
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Figure 6.3: The model B1 after achieving the two steps of the targeted attack
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CHAPTER 7
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE LCD ALGORITHM
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGMs) have become a powerful framework for not only
representing but reasoning with probabilistic knowledge. Learning the structure of proba-
bilistic graphical models, namely Bayesian networks, can be performed either subjectively
from knowledge of experts or objectively from observed data [30, 44]. The former method
is used when the structure of the probabilistic model is simple. Whereas, the latter method
is used when the structure of the graphical model is intricate for human brains to process.
Learning the structure of Bayesian networks from data is very important in machine
learning and artiﬁcial intelligence applications. There are three main approaches to learn
the structure of Bayesian networks from data. The constraint-based approach, such as the
IC algorithm [64], the PC algorithm [60, 61] and the NPC algorithm [62], counts on con-
ditional independence tests to determine the DAG of the learned Bayesian network. The
score-based approach, such as AIC [1], BDe [27, 45], K2 [21], and BIC algorithm [56],
assigns a score for each Bayesian network structure (this score indicates how well the
Bayesian network structure ﬁts the data) and then perform a (usually greedy) search algo-
rithm to select the structure with the highest score. The hybrid approach, such as CB [59]
and EGS algorithm [22], relies on the idea of using both constraint-based algorithms and
score-based algorithms. The use of constraint-based algorithms will reduce the search
space (i.e., it will reduce the number of candidate DAGs). Thenceforth, score-based algo-
rithms can be used to select the optimal DAG.
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Within the constraint-based approach, there are two main methods for learning the
structure of Bayesian networks: 1) The traditional constraint-based method in which the
structure of the whole Bayesian network is constructed over all variables, such as the
IC [64], PC [60, 61], NPC [62] algorithms. 2) The decomposable constraint-based method
in which the structure of the large Bayesian network is decomposed into many small
Bayesian networks, such as LCD (Learn Chain graphs via Decomposition) algorithm [68,
37]. In both methods, Bayesian structure learning algorithms are prone to model inaccura-
cies resulting from corrupt data in the training phase (a.k.a Data Poisoning Attacks [6]).
Data poisoning attacks are one of the most important emerging security threat against
machine learning systems. These attacks aim to corrupt the machine learning model by
contaminating the data in the training phase [6, 9, 43]. The lack of resilience in Bayesian
network algorithms against such attacks leads to model inaccuracies when learning the
structure from data. Therefore, it is crucial to address the robustness of Bayesian network
algorithms against data poisoning attacks especially if these models are going to be used in
machine learning applications to reliably automate jobs.
In this section, we present an empirical analysis of the robustness of the LCD algorithm
against adversarial attacks that aim to invalidate the new to-be-learned Bayesian model as
deﬁned in Chapter 5. We investigate two potential model invalidation attacks against the
LCD algorithm: (1) Model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation, and
(2) Model invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests.
7.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To conduct the experiments of this section, we used the same dataset that was generated
to evaluate the robustness of the PC learning algorithm (dataset DB1 as shown in Chap-
ter 1). Using the LCD algorithm on dataset DB1 with 0.05 signiﬁcance setting, the re-
sulting structure is given in Figure 1.5. While the new learned network using the LCD
algorithm (network B3 as shown in Figure 1.5) belongs to a different Markov equivalence
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class than the original Chest Clinic network (Figure 1.3), we will use the networkB3 as the
starting point of our experiments.
7.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON THE
NOTION OF D-SEPARATION
In this experiment, we evaluated the effectiveness of model invalidation attacks based on
the notion of d-separation (as introduced in section 5.2) to poison the Chest Clinic Network
dataset DB1 and thereby impact the new to-be-learned model by the LCD algorithm. We
study the robustness of the LCD structure learning algorithm against the data poisoning
attacks that aim to introduce a new v-structure to the Bayesian model B3. That is,
1) add the links D − S, B − L and S − E to the serial connections D → B → S,
B → S → L and S → L→ E, respectively, and
2) add the link A− E to the diverging connection A← T → E.
We also study the robustness of the LCD structure learning algorithm against the attacks
aiming to break an existing v-structure, i.e., to shield the collider T → E ← L.
We present our results in Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5. We succeeded to invalidate
the model learned by the LCD algorithm. We had to introduce 90 contaminated cases in
order to introduce the linkD−S. To introduce linksB−L, S−E, and A−E required 13,
46, and 4 corrupt cases, respectively. To shield the collider E, we only needed 8 poisoning
data items.
7.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MODEL INVALIDATION ATTACKS BASED ON
MARGINAL INDEPENDENCE TESTS
In this section, we need our link strength measure (L_S) to measure the strengths of links
of the Bayesian network model B3. Our goal is to determine (1) the weakest edge to be
deleted from B3, and (2) the most beleivable edge to be added to B3. The results of our
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Figure 7.1: The result of adding the edge D − S to the Bayesian model B3
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Figure 7.2: The result of adding the edge B − L to the Bayesian model B3
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Figure 7.3: The result of adding the edge S − E to the Bayesian model B3
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Figure 7.4: The result of adding the edge A− E to the Bayesian model B3
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Figure 7.5: The result of adding the edge T − L to the Bayesian model B3
link strength measure to measure the strengths of the Chest Clinic Network are presented
in Figure 5.8. We note that the edge A − T is the weakest edge in the Bayesian network
model B3. Also, the edge D − S is the most believable edge that could be added to the
model B3.
We present our results of deleting the weakest edge from B3 in Figure 7.6. We suc-
ceeded to invalidate the model learned by the LCD algorithm. We had to modify only 3
cases to break the weakest link A− T .
We present our results of adding the most believable yet incorrect edge to the model B3
in Figure 7.7. We succeeded to invalidate the model learned by the LCD algorithm. We
had to modify only 90 cases to add the most believable link D − S.
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Figure 7.6: The result of deleting the weakest edge A− T from the Bayesian model B3
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Figure 7.7: The result of adding the most believable yet incorrect edge D − S to the
Bayesian model B3
Table 7.1: Summary of the required number of corrupt cases to contaminated the dataset
DB1.
Link # of required cases to corruptthe PC Algorithm
# of required cases to corrupt
the LCD Algorithm
Add A→ E 3 5
Add B → L 13 13
Add D → S 74 90
Add S → E 40 46
Add T → L 8 8
Remove A→ T 3 3
7.5 WHICH ALGORITHM IS MORE ROBUST TO DATA POISONING ATTACKS: THE PC
ALGORITHM OR THE LCD ALGORITHM?
From the previous experiments that were presented in sections 7.3 and 7.4, we can summa-
rize the required number of corrupt cases to contaminate the dataset DB1 as follows:
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We observe that the number of required cases to contaminate the LCD algorithm is al-
ways larger than or equal to the number of required cases to contaminate the PC algorithm.
We observe that the LCD algorithm is more robust to data poisoning attacks than the PC
algorithm. We conjecture that this is due to the fact that the LCD algorithm learns the
structure of the Bayesian network via the decomposition approach.
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CHAPTER 8
LONG-DURATION DATA POISONING ATTACKS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In our the previous chapters, we studied data poisoning attacks against Bayesian structure
learning algorithms. For a Bayesian structure learning algorithms, given the dataset, DSv,
and the corresponding model, B1 (Equation 9.1), a malicious attacker attempts to craft an
input dataset, DSp, such that this contaminated dataset will have an immediate impact on
DSv and thereby on B1. The defender periodically retrains the machine learning system
to recover the structure of the new model, B2, using DSu, the combination of the origi-
nal dataset DSv and the attacker supplied DSp. We call such an attack a “one-step" data
poisoning attack as malicious attackers send all contaminated cases at once.
In this chapter, we introduce long-duration data poisoning attacks against structure
learning algorithms. Long-duration poisoning attacks are adversarial multi-step attacks
in which a malicious attacker attempts to send contaminated cases over a period of time,
t = {1, 2, . . . , w}. That is, at every time point i, a malicious attacker sends in a new dataset,
DSi
c, which contains Ni cases, λiNi of which are corrupted cases for some 0 < λi < 1 (λi is
the data poisoning rate at which we allowed to add contaminated cases to DSi
c at iteration
i). Even though the defender periodically retrains the model, B′2, at time i using the dataset
DSi
l_d, which is equal to DSv ∪ ∪it=1DStc, it is not easy to detect the long-duration attack
since such an attack is not instantaneous.
By the end of the long-duration poisoning attack, i.e., at time point w, the attacker
would have injected
∪w
t=1DSt
c to DSv, resulting in a new dataset, DSw
l_d. We assume that
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attackers cannot add more than βN cases to DSv (i.e., 0 < ∪wt=1 λtN t < βN ). When the
defender retrains the model, B′2, using the datasetDSw
l_d, the attack will dramatically affect
the resulting model. Note that this attack is sophisticated since the attacker may not need
to send contaminated cases with the last contaminated dataset (the wth dataset) in the long-
duration attack, i.e.,DSw
c may trigger the attack with no poisoned cases, as our experiments
show.
We propose causative, long-duration model invalidation attacks against Bayesian net-
work structure learning algorithms. Such attacks are deﬁned as malicious active attacks
in which adversarial opponents attempt to arbitrarily corrupt the structure of the original
Bayesian network model in any way. The goal of adversaries in these attacks is to poison
the validated training dataset, DSv, over a period of time t = {1, . . . , w} using the con-
taminated dataset
∪w
i=1DSt
c such thatDSv will be no longer valid. We categorize causative
long-duration model invalidation attacks against Bayesian network structure learning algo-
rithms into two types: (1) Model invalidation attacks based on the notion of d-separation
and (2) Model invalidation attacks based on marginal independence tests.
Causative, long-duration model invalidation attacks which are based on the notion of
d-separation are adversarial attacks in which adversaries attempt to introduce a new link
in any triple (A − B − C) in the original Bayesian network model, B1. The goal of the
introduced malicious link, (A−C), is to change the independence relations and the Markov
equivalence class of B1. Within such attacks, we can identify two subtypes: (i) Creating
a New Converging Connection (V-structure), and (ii) Breaking an Existing Converging
Connection (V-structure). See chapter 5 for more algorithmic details.
Causative, long-duration model invalidation attacks which are based on marginal inde-
pendence tests are adversarial attacks in which adversaries attempt to use marginal indepen-
dence tests in order to change the conditional independence statements between variables
in the original model, B1. Such attacks can be divided into two main subtypes: (i) Remov-
ing the Weakest Edge, and (ii) Adding the Most Believable Edge yet incorrect Edge. See
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chapter 5 for more algorithmic details.
Algorithm 8 provides algorithmic details of long duration data poisoning attacks on
machine learning algorithms that aim to achieve a certain attack by sending in contaminated
cases over a period of time t.
Algorithm 8: Long Duration Poisoning Attacks
Input : DSv[x1; . . . ;xT ] ◃ Validated dataset with attributes x1; . . . ;xT .
Output: DSw
l_d[x1; . . . ;xT ], or a failure message if the required number of cases to
poison DSv[x1; . . . ;xT ],∑wt=1 λtNt, is greater than βN.
1 Procedure Long Duration Attacks(DSv)
2 τ = βN ◃ we default set β = 0.05;
3 B1 = BN_Algo(DSv[x1; . . . ;xT ]);
4 Choose w ◃ Number of times over which smoothly contaminated datasets will
be sent;
5 for t = 1; t ≤ w; t++ do
6 Generate DSt
Clean;
7 end
8 Plan an attack against the dataset (DSv ∪∑wt=1 DStClean) ◃ Note that there are
several types of attacks deﬁned in Appendix ??;
9 for t = 1; t ≤ w; t++ do
10 Craft a new dataset, DSt
p ◃ where 0 ≤ λtN t ≤ τw ;
11 DSt
s_c = (DStClean ∪ DStp);
12 DSt
l_d[x1; . . . ;xT ] = DSv[x1; . . . ;xT ] ∪ DSts_c[x1; . . . ;xT ];
13 B
′
2 = BN_Algo(DStl_d[x1; . . . ;xT ]);
14 end
15 if
∑w
t=1 λtNt ≤ βN then
16 Return DSt
l_d[x1; . . . ;xT ];
17 else
18 Return msg “Algorithm ?? failed to achieve the long duration attack";
19 end
20 end
8.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
8.2.1 ONE-STEP DATA POISONING ATTACKS
To set up the experiment, we implemented the Chest Clinic Network using HuginTM Re-
search 8.1. We then used HuginTM case generator [38, 49] to generate a simulated dataset
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of 20, 000 cases. We call this dataset DSv. Using the PC algorithm on dataset DSv with
0.05 signiﬁcance setting [38], the resulting validated structure, B1 = PC_Algo(DSv), is
given in Figure 1.4. While the two networks in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 belong to different
Markov equivalence classes, we will use the validated network B1 as the starting point of
our experiment.
We evaluated the effectiveness of one-step data poisoning attacks against the validated
dataset DSv (i.e., against the validated model B1). An attacker aims to use one-step data
poisoning attacks to inject in a contaminated datasetDSp intoDSv, resulting in the dataset
DSu. The defender retrains the machine learning model by feeding the new datasetDSu to
the PC learning algorithm (B2 = PC_Algo(DSu)), resulting in the model B2.
We aim to study the attacker’s goals, i.e., study the feasibility of one-step data poisoning
attacks, which might be as follows: (i) introduce new v-structures: that is, (1) add the links
D − S and S − E to the serial connections D → B → S and S → L → E, respectively,
and (2) add the link A−E to the diverging connection A← T → E; (ii) break an existing
v-structure T → E ← L, i.e., shield the collider E; (iii) remove the weakest edge, i.e.,
remove the edge T → A; and (iv) add the most believable edge, i.e., add the edge B → L.
(Note that, for ﬁnding the weakest link in a given causal model or the most believable link
to be added to a causal model, we refer the readers to our previous works [9, 6] for technical
details on how to measure link strength of causal models).
In all of the scenarios, the attacker succeeded in corrupting the new model that was
going to be learned by the defender, the model B2. The attacker had to introduce a dataset
DSp with 67 corrupt cases (data items) to introduce the link D − S in the newly learned
modelB2. To introduce links S−E andA−E required 21 and 7 corrupt cases, respectively.
To shield the collider E, the attacker only needed 4 poisoning data items. The attacker had
to modify only 3 cases to break the weakest link A − T . To add the most believable link
B − L required to only 7 corrupt data items.
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8.2.2 LONG-DURATION DATA POISONING ATTACKS
To set up the implementation of long-duration attacks, let DSv be a validated training
dataset with attributes x1, . . . , xn and N cases, and β be data poisoning rate at which
attackers are allowed to add new “contaminated" cases toDSv. LetDSi
c be a newly crafted
dataset also with attributes x1, . . . , xn and Ni cases, and λi be data poisoning rate at which
attackers allowed to add new crafted cases to DSi
c (we default set 0 ≤ ∪wt=1 λiN i ≤ βN ).
We start by calculating τ , which is the maximum number of poisoned cases that could
be added to DSv over a period of time t = {1, . . . , w}. We then learn the structure of the
validated model B1 from DSv using the PC algorithm.
We then iterate w times. In each iteration t, we generate a clean dataset DSt
clean and a
poisoned dataset DSt
p. We let DSt
c = DStclean ∪DStp (note that, DStc has Nt cases, λtNt of
which are poisoned). After that, we create the union of DSt
c and DSv, resulting in DSt
l_d,
which is used to learn the structure of model B′2. Note that, in each iteration the number of
cases in DSt
p should be between 0 (i.e., no poisoned cases) and τ
w
, which is the maximum
number of poisoned cases that could be added to DSt
c in the tth iteration.
We terminate after iteration w. If
∪w
t=1 λtNt ≤ βN , we return DStl_d; otherwise, we
print a failure message since implementing the long-duration attack onDSv is not feasible.
We assumed that w = 4, which means that the attacker is allowed to send in four
contaminated datasets to achieve the long-duration data poisoning attack. We divided the
20, 000 case dataset that was generated for one-step data poisoning attacks in section 8.2.1
into ﬁve datasets as follows: 12, 000 cases are used asDSv; and the rest is divided into four
datasets of 2, 000 cases each. We call these four datasets DS1Clean, DS2Clean, DS3Clean, and
DS4
Clean. Using the PC algorithm on dataset DSv with 0.05 signiﬁcance setting [38], the
resulting validated structure, B1 = PC_Algo(DSv), is given in Figure 1.4, which is the
starting point of this experiment.
We evaluated the effectiveness of long-duration data poisoning attacks against the vali-
dated datasetDSv (i.e., against the validated modelB1). At every time point t = {1, . . . , w},
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the attacker injects a contaminated dataset DSt
Crafted into DSt
Clean, resulting in the dataset
DSt
c. This resulting dataset is then sent in as a new source of information. The defender
receives DSt
c and retrains the validated model, B1, by creating the union of DSv and the
new incoming dataset DSt
c and feeding them to the PC algorithm, resulting in the model
B
′
2 (i.e., B
′
2 = PC_Algo(DSv ∪DStc)).
The results of our experiments are presented in Table 8.1. In all of the scenarios, the
attacker succeeded in achieving the desired modiﬁcation. In our experiments, we assumed
that t = {1, . . . , 4}. For every one of the studied long-duration attacks on the dataset DSv
(Tables 8.1a, 8.1b, 8.1c, 8.1d, 8.1e, and 8.1f), the adversary had to send in the attack over
4 datasets. That is, at every time point t (for t = 1, . . . , 4), the attacker had to create the
union of DSt
Clean andDSt
Crafted resulting in DSt
c, which was going to be sent to the targeted
machine learning system as a new source of information. The defender, on the other hand,
retrained the machine learning model every time a new incoming dataset DSt
c arrived.
Note that, in our experiments, long-duration attacks require the same number of con-
taminated cases as the one-step data poisoning attacks. An important observation is that the
malicious attacker does not always have to send poisoned cases in the last dataset that will
trigger the attack. For instance, in our experiments, when introducing the link A→ E (Ta-
ble 8.1a), shielding collider E (Table 8.1b), and removing the weakest edge (Table 8.1f),
the last contaminated dataset, DS4
c, had no contaminated cases, which makes it impossible
for the defender to ﬁnd what caused a change in the newly learned model.
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Table 8.1: Results of long-duration data poisoning attacks againstDSv.
(a) Introducing the link A→ E in the diverging connection A← T → E.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 3 1 3 0
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,003 2,004 2,007 2,007
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,003 16,004 18,007 20,007
Model Change No No No Yes
(b) Breaking the v-structure T → E ← L.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 2 2 0 0
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,002 2,002 2,000 2,000
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,002 16,004 18,004 20,004
Model Change No No No Yes
(c) Add the most believable edge, B → L, to the causal model B1.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 2 2 1 2
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,002 2,002 2,001 2,002
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,002 16,004 18,005 20,007
Model Change No No No Yes
(d) Adding the link D → S to the serial connection D → B → S.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 20 20 23 4
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,020 2,020 2,023 2,004
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,020 16,040 18,063 20,067
Model Change No No No Yes
(e) Adding the link S → E to the serial connection S → L→ E.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 7 8 5 1
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,007 2,008 2,005 2,001
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,007 16,015 18,020 20,021
Model Change No No No Yes
(f) Removing the weakest link, T → A, from the causal model B1.
Time point t = {1, . . . , w} t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Number of clean cases at time point t (DSt
Clean) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Number of crafted cases at time point t (DSt
Crafted) 1 1 1 0
DSt
c = DStClean ∪ DStCrafted 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,000
DSt
l_d = DSv ∪ ∪wt=1DStc 14,001 16,002 18,003 20,003
Model Change No No No Yes
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CHAPTER 9
DETECTING ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN THE CONTEXT OF
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, several researchers addressed the problem of cyber attacks against
machine learning systems (see [35] for an overview). Machine learning techniques are
widely used; however, machine learning methods were not designed to function correctly
in adversarial settings [25, 28]. Data poisoning attacks are considered one of the most
important emerging security threats against machine learning systems [51, 65]. Data poi-
soning attacks aim to corrupt the machine learning model by contaminating the data in the
training phase [16]. Data poisoning was studied in different machine learning algorithms,
such as Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [16, 42, 32], Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [15, 14], Clustering [17, 12], and Neural Networks (NNs) [69]. However, these
efforts are not directly applicable to Bayesian structure learning algorithms.
There are two main methods used in defending against a poisoning attack: (1) robust
learning and (2) data sanitization [20]. Robust learning aims to increase learning algorithm
robustness, thereby reducing the overall inﬂuence that contaminated data samples have on
the algorithm. Data sanitization eliminates contaminated data samples from the training
data set prior to training a classiﬁer. While data sanitization shows promise to defend
against data poisoning, it is often impossible to validate every data source [20].
In this chapter, we use the causative model proposed by Barreno et al. [10] to con-
textualize Bayesian network vulnerabilities. We propose a 2-layered framework to detect
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poisoning attacks from untrusted data sources. Layer 1 enforces “reject on negative im-
pacts" detection [46]; i.e., input that changes the model is labeled malicious. Layer 2 aims
to detect long-duration attacks; i.e., it looks for cases in the incoming data that conﬂict with
the original Bayesian model.
The main contributions of this chapter are the following: We propose a 2-layered frame-
work for detecting data poisoning attacks. Our 2-layered framework detects both one-step
and long-duration data poisoning attacks. We use the distance between Bayesian network
models, B1 and B2, denoted as ds(B1, B2), to detect malicious data input (Equation 9.3)
for one-step attacks. For long-duration attacks, we use the value of data conﬂict (Equa-
tion 9.4) to detect potentially poisoned data. Our framework relies on ofﬂine analysis to
validate the potentially malicious datasets. We present our empirical results, showing the
effectiveness of our framework to detect both one-step and long-duration attacks. Our re-
sults indicate that the distance measure ds(B1, B2) (Equation 9.3) and the conﬂict measure
Conf(c, B1) (Equation 9.4) are sensitive to poisoned data.
9.2 PROBLEM SETTING
We focus on structure learning algorithms in Bayesian networks. Let DSv = {c1, . . . , cN}
be a validated dataset withN case. Each case c is over attributes x1, . . . , xn and of the form
c =< x1 = v1, . . . , xn = vn >, where vi is the value of attribute xi. A Bayesian network
model B1 is learned by feeding a validated dataset DSv into a Bayesian structure learning
algorithm, BN_Algo, such as the PC algorithm, which is the most widely used algorithm
for structure learning in Bayesian networks [61], as shown in Equation 9.1.
B1 = BN_Algo(DSv) (9.1)
The defender attempts to divide an incoming dataset, DSp, coming from an untrusted
source, into clean and poisoned cases. The attacker aims to inject a contaminated dataset,
DSp with the same attributes as DSv and N1 cases, into the validated training dataset,
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DSv. A learning error occurs if DSu, obtained by the union of DSv and DSp, results in a
Bayesian network learning model B2 (shown in Equation 9.2), such that there is a missing
link, a reversed link, or an additional link in B2 that is not in B1.
B2 = BN_Algo(DSu) (9.2)
To estimate the impact of the poisoned dataset on the validated dataset, we deﬁne a dis-
tance function between two Bayesian network models B1 and B2, denoted as ds(B1, B2).
Intuitively, B1 is the validated model and B2 is the potentially corrupted model.
Let B1 = (V,E1) and B2 = (V,E2) be two Bayesian network models where V =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} and E = {(xu, xv) : xu, xv ∈ V }. Let B1 be the validated model result-
ing from feeding DSv to a Bayesian network structure learning algorithm, and B2 be the
newly learned model resulting from feeding DSu to a Bayesian network structure learn-
ing algorithm. Let e1 = (xu, xv) be a directed edge from vertex xu to vertex xv, and
e2 = (xv, xu) be a directed edge from vertex xv to vertex xu (e2 is the reverse of e1). The
distance function, ds(B1, B2), is a non-negative function that measures the changes in the
newly learned model B2 with respect to the original model B1. The distance function,
ds(B1, B2), is deﬁned as follows:
(Distance measure) Let Bayesian network models B1 = (V,E1) and B2 = (V,E2)
be the results of feeding DSv and DSu, respectively, to a Bayesian network structure
learning algorithm. ds(B1, B2) is deﬁned as the sum of distances over pairs of vertices
(xu, xv) ∈ V × V as follows:
ds(B1, B2) =
∑
(xu,xv)∈V×V
dsxuxv(B1, B2) (9.3)
where dsxuxv(B1, B2) is the distance between every pair of vertices (xu, xv) ∈ V × V .
We deﬁne dsxuxv(B1, B2) as the cost of making a change to B1 that results in the
newly learned model B2. The function dsxuxv(B1, B2) between the two Bayesian network
models B1 and B2 is deﬁned as follows [23]:
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Status 1 (True Negative Edges): if ((e1 ̸∈ E1 && e2 ̸∈ E1) && (e1 ̸∈ E2 && e2 ̸∈ E2)),
then there is no edge (neither e1 nor e2) between vertex xu and vertex xv in either
models B1 and B2. Hence, dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 0.
Status 2 (True Positive Edges): if ((e1 ∈ E1 && e1 ∈ E2) || (e2 ∈ E1 && e2 ∈ E2)),
then the same edge (either e1 or e2) appears from vertex xu to vertex xv in both
models B1 and B2. Hence, dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 0.
Status 3 (False Negative Edges): if ((e1 || e2 ∈ E1) && (e1 && e2 ̸∈ E2)), then there
is an edge (either e1 or e2) from vertex xu to vertex xv in B1 that does not ex-
ist in B2. Without loss of generality, assume that the deleted edge from B1 is e1,
then if the indegree of vertex xv, denoted as indegree(xv), which is the number if
edge incoming to vertex xv, is greater than 1, then dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 8; otherwise,
dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 4.
Status 4 (False Positive Edges): if ((e1 && e2 ̸∈ E1) && (e1 || e2 ∈ E2)), then there is
an edge (either e1 or e2) from vertex xu to vertex xv in B2 but not the in B1. Without
loss of generality, assume that the added edge to B2 is e1, then if the indegree of
vertex xv, is greater than 1, then dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 8; otherwise, dsxuxv(B1, B2) =
4.
Status 5 (False Positive and True Negative Edges): if ((e1 ∈ E1 && e2 ∈ E2) && (e1 ∈
E2 && e2 ∈ E1)), then the edge from vertex xu to vertex xv in B1 is the reverse of
the edge from vertex xu to vertex xv in B2. Without loss of generality, assume that
there is an edge, e1, from xu to xv in B1, then e2 is the reverse of e1 in B2. If
the indegree of vertex xu, is greater than 1, then dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 8; otherwise,
dsxuxv(B1, B2) = 2.
To investigate the coherence of an instance case, c =< x1 = v1, . . . , xn = vn > (or
simply < v1, . . . , vn >), in DSp with the validated model B1, we use conﬂict measure,
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denoted as Conf(c, B1). Conﬂict measure, Conf(c, B1), is deﬁned as follows:
(Conﬂict measure) Let B1 be a Bayesian network model and let DSp be an incoming
dataset, Conf(c, B1) is deﬁned as the process of detecting how well a given case <
v1, . . . , vn > ﬁts the model B1 according to the following equation:
Conf(c, B1) = log2
P (v1) . . . P (vn)
P (v) (9.4)
where c =< v1, . . . , vn >, and P (v) is the prior probability of the evidence v [48].
If P (v) = 0, then we conclude that there is inconsistency among the observations
< v1, . . . , vn >. If the value of Conf(c, B1) is positive, then we can conclude that <
v1, . . . , vn > are negatively correlated (i.e., unlikely to be correlated as the model requires)
and thus are conﬂicting with the model B1. The higher the value of Conf(c, B1) is, the
more incompatibility we have between B1 and < v1, . . . , vn >.
In this paper, we adopt the causative model proposed by Barreno et al. [10]. Attacks on
machine learning systems are modeled as a game between malicious attackers and defend-
ers. In our setting, defenders aim to learn a validated Bayesian network modelB1 using the
datasetDSv with the fewest number of errors (minimum ds function). Malicious attackers
aim to mislead the defender into learning a contaminated model B2 using the dataset DSu,
obtained by pollutingDSv withDSp. We assume that malicious attackers have full knowl-
edge of how Bayesian network structure learning algorithms work. Also, we assume that
attackers have knowledge of the dataset DSv. In addition, we assume that the poisoning
percentage at which attackers are allowed to add new “contaminated" cases to DSv, β, is
less than or equal to 0.05. The game between malicious attackers and defenders can be
modeled as follows:
1. The defender: The defender uses a validated dataset DSv, to produce a validated
Bayesian network model B1.
2. The malicious attacker: The attacker injects a contaminated dataset, DSp, to be
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Table 9.1: Notations
Notation Description
DS[x1, . . . , xn] Schema for datasets with attributes x1, . . . , xn
DSv = {c1, . . . , cN} Validated dataset instance with attributes x1, . . . , xn
DSp = {c1, . . . , cN1} Crafted dataset instance with attributes x1, . . . , xn
β Data poisoning percentage for DSv
B1 The result of feeding DSv to a learning algorithm
B2 The result of feeding DSu to a learning algorithm
DSi
c = {c1, . . . , cNi} Contaminated dataset instance at time point i
λi Data poisoning rate for DSi
c
ds(B1, B2) Distance function between models B1 and B2
Conf(c, B1) Conﬂict measure of how well the case c ﬁts B1
unioned with the original dataset,DSv, with the goal of changing the Markov equiv-
alence class of the original validated model, B1.
3. Evaluation by the defender:
- The defender feeds the new dataset DSu (Note that, DSu = DSv ∪ DSp) to a
Bayesian network structure learning algorithm, resulting in B2.
- The defender calculates the distance function ds(B1, B2).
- If ds(B1, B2) = 0, then Bayesian models B1 and B2 are identical. Otherwise, i.e.,
ds(B1, B2) > 0, the newly learned Bayesian model B2 is different from the
original validated model B1.
- For each case c, the defender calculates the value of conﬂict measure Conf(c, B1).
- If Conf(c, B1) is positive, then the case c conﬂict with the Bayesian model B1.
Otherwise, the newly incoming case is validated and added to DSv.
Note, that the goal of malicious attackers is to maximize the quantity ds(B1, B2). The
notations used in this chapter are summarized in Table 9.1.
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9.3 FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING DATA POISONING ATTACKS
In this section, we present our detective framework for data poisoning attacks. Our tech-
niques build on the data sanitization approach that was proposed by Nelson et al. [46].
We extend Nelson et al. approach such that it is applicable to detect both one-step and
long-duration causative attacks.
The main components of our framework are: (1) Structure learning Algorithms: the
PC learning algorithm, (2) FLoD: ﬁrst layer of detection, and (3) SLoD: second layer of
detection.
First Layer of Detection: In the FLoD, our framework uses “Reject On Negative
Impact" defense [46] to examine the full dataset (DSv ∪ DSp) to detect the impact of DSp
on DSv. The attacker aims to use DSp to change the Markov equivalence class of the
validated model, B1. The ﬁrst layer of detection detects the impact of adversarial attacks
that aim to corrupt the model B1 using one-step data poisoning attacks.
In the FLoD, we use the distance function ds described in section 9.2 as a method for
detecting the negative impact of DSp on the validated model B1. If ds(B1, B2) is greater
than zero, then the new incoming dataset, DSp, is potentiality malicious. In this case, we
sent DSp to be checked ofﬂine. Otherwise, we proceed with the second layer of detection,
SLoD, looking for long-duration data poisoning attacks.
Algorithm 9 provides algorithmic details of FLoD detect one-step data poisoning at-
tacks.
Second Layer of Detection: In the SLoD, our framework uses “Data Conﬂict Analy-
sis" [48] to examine the newly incoming datasetDSp to detect ifDSp has conﬂicting cases
with the original modelB1. The Second layer of detection detects sophisticated adversarial
attacks that aim to corrupt the model B1, such as long-duration data poisoning attacks.
In the SLoD, we use the value of the conﬂict measure Conf(c, B1) described in sec-
tion 9.2 as a method for detecting whether or not a case, c, in the newly incoming dataset,
DSp, is conﬂicting with the original model B1. If the P (v) is equal to zero, then the case
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Algorithm 9: First Layer of Detection
Input : DSv = {c1, . . . , cN} and DSp = {c¯1, . . . , c¯N1}
Output: ds(B1, B2)
1 Generate B1 from DSv;
2 Generate B2 from DSv ∪ DSp;
3 Calculate ds(B1, B2) ◃ as described in section 9.2;
4 if ds(B1, B2) > 0 then
5 Return ds(B1, B2);
6 Send DSp to be checked ofﬂine;
7 else
8 Go to Algorithm 10;
9 end
c is inconsistent with the validated model B1. If Conf(c, B1) is positive, then the case c
is incompatible with the validated model B1. In these two situations, we add inconsistent
and incompatible cases to DSconf. DSconf is then sent to be checked ofﬂine. Thereby, the
model B1 will be retrained according to the following equation: B1 = BN_Algo(DSv)
where DSv = DSv ∪ (DSp\DSconf).
Algorithm 10 provides algorithmic details of the SLoD detect long-duration data poi-
soning attacks.
The process of applying our framework is summarized in Figure 9.1. The workﬂow
of our framework is described as follows: (1) A validated dataset, DSv, which is a clean
training dataset that is used to recover a validated machine learning model B1. (2) A
new incoming dataset, DSp, which is coming from an untrusted source and a potentially
malicious dataset, is used along with DSv to learn B2. (3) FLoD checks for one-step data
poisoning attacks. If model change occurs (i.e., ds(B1, B2) > 0), send DSp for ofﬂine
evaluation. Else, (4) SLoD checks for long-duration data poisoning attacks. If the value
of conﬂict measure is positive (i.e., Conf(c, B1) > 0), send conﬂicting data to ofﬂine
evaluation. Else, update the validated dataset.
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Algorithm 10: Second Layer of Detection
Input : DSv = {c1, . . . , cN} and DSp = {c¯1, . . . , c¯N1}
Output: DSv, DSconf.
1 Generate B1 from DSv;
2 DSconf = ϕ;
3 for every case c in DSp do
4 Calculate P (v) ◃ i.e., the probability of the evidence for c;
5 if P (v) = 0 then
6 DSconf = DSconf ∪ {c} ◃ i.e., c is inconsistent with B1;
7 DSp = DSp \ {c} ◃ remove c from DSp;
8 else
9 Conf(c, B1) = log2 P (v1)...P (vn)P (v) ◃ calculate conﬂict measure for the case c;
10 if Conf(c, B1) > 0 then
11 DSconf = DSconf ∪ {c} ◃ i.e., c is incompatible with B1;
12 DSp = DSp \ {c};
13 end
14 end
15 if DSconf ̸= ϕ then
16 Send DSconf to be checked ofﬂine;
17 end
18 DSv = DSv ∪ (DSp\DSconf);
19 Return DSv, DSconf;
20 end
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Figure 9.1: Framework for detecting data poisoning attacks.
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9.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We implemented our prototype system using the Chest Clinic Network [34]. We used the
Chest Clinic Network to demonstrate the data poisoning attacks and our detection capabili-
ties. In each experiment, we manually generated poisoned datasets. Given the contingency
table of two random variables A and B in a Bayesian network model with i and j states,
respectively. To introduce a malicious link between A and B, we add corrupt cases to the
cell with the highest test statistic value in the contingency table. To remove the link be-
tween A and B, we transfer cases from the cell with the highest test statistics value to the
one with the lowest value.
9.4.1 DISCUSSION: DETECTING DATA POISONING ATTACKS
The results of using our framework to detect one-step data poisoning attacks are presented
in Table 9.2. Algorithm 9 succeeded to detect the negative impact (i.e., the change in the
Markov equivalence class) of the new incoming dataset DSp on the validated model B1.
Table 9.2: Results of using FLoD to detect one-step data poisoning attacks.
Attack Attack’s class ds(B1, B2) score
Introduce the link A→ E New v-structure 12
Introduce the link D → S New v-structure 24
Introduce the link S → E New v-structure 54
Introduce the link T → L Shield an existing collider 16
Remove the link A→ T Delete the weakest link 4
Introduce the link B → L Add the most believable link 32
The results using our framework to detect long-duration data poisoning attacks are
summarized in Table 9.3. Algorithm 10 succeeded to detect the long-duration impact of
DSc on the validated dataset DSv. Note, that FLoD using traditional reject on negative
impact was not able to detect long-duration attacks. However, when using the SLoD, we
were able to detect the conﬂicting cases, which are either inconsistent or incompatible with
the original validated model B1 (A detailed experiment is presented in Figure 9.2). Such
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cases might be exploited by a malicious adversary to trigger the long-duration attack at a
later time. Also, in some attacks no poisoned cases are even required to be sent with DSc
to trigger the long-duration attack, which is very hard to detect.
In summary, our 2-layered approach was able to detect both one-step and long-duration
attacks. Moreover, our solution did not lose all the incoming datasets; we only send con-
ﬂicting cases to be checked ofﬂine. We have carried out over 200 experiments for long-
duration attacks. A comprehensive description of these experiments is given in [5].
Table 9.3: Results of using SLoD to detect long-duration data poisoning attacks.
Attack Attack’s class Algorithm 10 decision
Introduce A→ E New v-structure Inconsistent observations
Introduce D → S New v-structure Incompatible observations
Introduce S → E New v-structure Inconsistent observations
Introduce T → L Shield an existing collider Inconsistent observations
Remove A→ T Delete weakest link Inconsistent\Incompatible observations
Introduce B → L Add most believable link Inconsistent observations
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(a) DS1
c has 20 incompatible cases. (b) DS2c has 20 incompatible cases.
(c) DS3
c has 23 incompatible cases. (d) DS4c has 4 incompatible cases.
Figure 9.2: The result of using SLoD to detect a long-duration attack that aims to introduce
the link D → S in the Chest Clinic dataset, DSv. We present the case number in DStc
as the variable on the X-axis and the value of our conﬂict measure Conf(c, B1) as the
variable on the Y-axis. A case is incompatible (conﬂicting) with the validated model B1 if
Conf(c, B1) > 0.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
10.1 CONCLUSION
As machine learning techniques become more pervasive, it is important to be aware of
the danger of malicious attackers based on introducing corrupted data items. In this dis-
sertation, we demonstrated the vulnerability of structural learning algorithms for Bayesian
networks to adversarial attacks [7]. We have developed a theoretical framework to classify
data poisoning attacks against the Bayesian network structure learning algorithms [4]. We
proposed a novel measure of link strength that is useful for security analysis in the con-
text of Bayesian networks. We demonstrated the vulnerability of the PC algorithm against
one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks. We proposed a 2-layered framework for
detecting data poisoning attacks.
We implemented our approaches using the Chest Clinic Network which is a widely
used network in Bayesian networks. Our ﬁndings indicate that Bayesian network structure
learning algorithms are highly sensitive to data poisoning attacks. We also demonstrated
that attackers could corrupt the learning outcome in a way that structural learning algo-
rithms will learn the desired structure. Our novel link strength measure plays a crucial role
in identifying vulnerable network structure and the ease of corrupting the Bayesian model.
Our results also indicate that Bayesian network structure learning algorithms are vulnerable
to both one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks. Our framework is effective in
detecting both one-step and long-duration data poisoning attacks, as it thoroughly validates
and veriﬁes training data before such data is being incorporated into the model.
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10.2 FUTURE WORK
Future work of this dissertation are as follows:
1. We will investigate the robustness of the LCD algorithm against long-duration data
poisoning attacks. We will follow the same schema like the PC algorithm. That
is, we will investigate long-duration model invalidation attacks and targeted change
attack that aim to corrupt the validated Bayesian network model over time.
2. We aim to focus on ofﬂine validation of potentially malicious datasets. Currently,
our approach detects datasets that either change the Bayesian network structure (dis-
tance measure) or in conﬂict with the validated model (conﬂict measure). We are
investigating methods for (1) distinguishing actual model shift from model enrich-
ment, i.e., our initial model was based on data that was not fully representative of the
“true" distribution, and (2) determining if cases are truly conﬂicting or again if the
initial model poorly approximates the “true" distribution.
3. We will also investigate the applicability of Wisdom of the Crowd (WoC) [70].
Rather than human experts, we plan to use an ensemble of classiﬁers, i.e., take the
votes of competing algorithms instead of the votes of humans. In the case of an en-
semble of classiﬁers, one could investigate the likelihood of unexpected cases and
adjust the sensitivity to anomalies by how much perturbation it causes in the model.
4. We will investigate the possibility of using our link strength measure for defending
against data poisoning attacks. In particular, we aim to monitor change in link-
strength and ﬁnd pattern of malicious (misuse) activities.
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APPENDIX A
COMPUTATIONS OF POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
In order to run our experiments, we need to compute the posterior distribution (Beta distri-
bution) for each link in the Bayesian network model. Posterior distribution is proportional
to the prior distribution (Beta distribution) times the likelihood function (Binomial distri-
bution).
In our working example, which is the Chest Clinic network, we will calculate the pos-
terior distribution for each link in the network assuming a completely uninformative prior,
i.e., a uniform distribution, Beta(1, 1), and using the datasetDB1 to calculate the likelihood
function. For each edge, given a statistical table from our data set DB1 and uninformative
prior Beta(1,1), we will calculate the posterior distribution using these equations:
Posterior = Prior × Likelihood
P (θ | y) = P (θ)× P (y | θ)
P (θ | y) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
P (θ | y) = Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
A.1 EDGES OF THE CHEST CLINIC NETWORK
In this appendix, we compute the posterior probability for each link in the original Chest
Clinic Network as follows:
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Table A.1: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(B | S)
S
B no yes missing
no 3898 1971 0
yes 1513 3018 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.1 CALCULATING P(B | S)
P (B = yes | S = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4989, 3018)
= Beta(3018 + 1, 4989− 3018 + 1)
= Beta(3019, 1972)
P (B = yes | S = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5411, 1513)
= Beta(1513 + 1, 5411− 1513 + 1)
= Beta(1514, 3899)
P (B = no | S = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4989, 1971)
= Beta(1971 + 1, 4989− 1971 + 1)
= Beta(1972, 3019)
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Figure A.1: Beta Distribution for P(B | S)
P (B = no | S = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5411, 3898)
= Beta(3898 + 1, 5411− 3898 + 1)
= Beta(3899, 1514)
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Table A.2: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(L | S)
S
L no yes missing
no 4965 4509 0
yes 46 480 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.2 CALCULATING P(L | S)
P (L = yes | S = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4989, 480)
= Beta(480 + 1, 4989− 480 + 1)
= Beta(481, 4510)
P (L = yes | S = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5011, 46)
= Beta(46 + 1, 5011−−46 + 1)
= Beta(47, 4966)
P (L = no | S = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4989, 4509)
= Beta(4509 + 1, 4989−−4509 + 1)
= Beta(4510, 481)
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Figure A.2: Beta Distribution for P(L | S)
P (L = no | S = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5011, 4965)
= Beta(4965 + 1, 5011−−4965 + 1)
= Beta(4966, 47)
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Table A.3: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(T | A)
A
T no yes missing
no 9788 98 0
yes 105 9 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.3 CALCULATING P(T | A)
P (T = yes | A = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(107, 9)
= Beta(9 + 1, 107− 9 + 1)
= Beta(10, 99)
P (T = yes | A = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9893, 105)
= Beta(105 + 1, 9893− 105 + 1)
= Beta(106, 9789)
P (T = no | A = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(107, 98)
= Beta(98 + 1, 107− 98 + 1)
= Beta(99, 10)
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Figure A.3: Beta Distribution for P(T | A)
P (T = no | A = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9893, 9788)
= Beta(9788 + 1, 9893− 9788 + 1)
= Beta(9789, 106)
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Table A.4: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(E | T )
T
E no yes missing
no 9364 0 0
yes 522 114 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.4 CALCULATING P(E | T )
P (E = yes | T = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(114, 114)
= Beta(114 + 1, 114− 114 + 1)
= Beta(115, 1)
P (E = yes | T = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9866, 522)
= Beta(522 + 1, 9893− 522 + 1)
= Beta(523, 9365)
P (E = no | T = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(114, 0)
= Beta(0 + 1, 114− 0 + 1)
= Beta(1, 115)
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Figure A.4: Beta Distribution for P(E | T )
P (E = no | T = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9886, 9364)
= Beta(9364 + 1, 9886− 9364 + 1)
= Beta(9365, 523)
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Table A.5: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(E | L)
L
E no yes missing
no 9364 0 0
yes 110 526 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.5 CALCULATING P(E | L)
P (E = yes | L = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(526, 526)
= Beta(526 + 1, 526− 526 + 1)
= Beta(527, 1)
P (E = yes | L = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9474, 110)
= Beta(110 + 1, 9474− 110 + 1)
= Beta(111, 9365)
P (E = no | L = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(526, 0)
= Beta(0 + 1, 526− 0 + 1)
= Beta(1, 527)
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Figure A.5: Beta Distribution for P(E | L)
P (E = no | L = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9474, 9364)
= Beta(9364 + 1, 9474− 9364 + 1)
= Beta(9365, 111)
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Table A.6: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(X | E)
E
X no yes missing
no 8911 13 0
yes 453 623 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.6 CALCULATING P(X | E)
P (X = yes | E = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(636, 623)
= Beta(623 + 1, 636−−623 + 1)
= Beta(624, 14)
P (X = yes | E = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9364, 453)
= Beta(453 + 1, 9364− 453 + 1)
= Beta(454, 8912)
P (X = no | E = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(636, 13)
= Beta(13 + 636− 13 + 1)
= Beta(14, 624)
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Figure A.6: Beta Distribution for P(X | E)
P (X = no | E = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9364, 8911)
= Beta(8911 + 1, 9364− 8911 + 1)
= Beta(8912, 454)
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Table A.7: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(D | E)
E
D no yes missing
no 5522 117 0
yes 3842 519 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.7 CALCULATING P(D | E)
P (D = yes | E = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(636, 519)
= Beta(519 + 1, 636− 519 + 1)
= Beta(520, 118)
P (D = yes | E = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9364, 3842)
= Beta(3842 + 1, 9364− 3842 + 1)
= Beta(3843, 5523)
P (D = no | E = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(636, 117)
= Beta(117 + 1, 636− 117 + 1)
= Beta(118, 520)
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Figure A.7: Beta Distribution for P(D | E)
P (D = no | E = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(9364, 5522)
= Beta(5522 + 1, 9364− 5522 + 1)
= Beta(5523, 3843)
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Table A.8: The contingency table of the observed counts of P(D | B)
B
D no yes missing
no 4745 894 0
yes 724 3637 0
missing 0 0 0
A.1.8 CALCULATING P(D | B)
P (D = yes | B = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4531, 3637)
= Beta(3637 + 1, 4531− 3637 + 1)
= Beta(3638, 895)
P (D = yes | B = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5469, 724)
= Beta(724 + 1, 5469− 724 + 1)
= Beta(725, 4746)
P (D = no | B = yes) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(4531, 894)
= Beta(894 + 1, 4531− 894 + 1)
= Beta(895, 3638)
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Figure A.8: Beta Distribution for P(D | B)
P (D = no | B = no) = Beta(α, β)×Binomial(n, θ)
= Beta(y + α, n− y + β)
= Beta(1, 1)×Binomial(5469, 4745)
= Beta(4745 + 1, 5469− 4745 + 1)
= Beta(4746, 725)
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APPENDIX B
COMPUTATIONS OF LINK STRENGTH MEASURE (L_S)
B.1 USING L_S ON THE CHEST CLINIC NETWORK
Given the Posterior distributions table for each link of the Chest Clinic Network as follows
(Calculated in Appendix A):
We apply our link strengths measure (L_S) (Equation 4.1, which is presented in Chap-
ter 4)
L_S(V ariable1 → V ariable2) = min
y∈Y
(pdf( y + α
α + n+ β ))
to ﬁnd the strengths of each link as follows:
B.1.1 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE S → L
L_S(S → L) = min(pdf(Beta(481, 4510)), pdf(Beta(47, 4966)),
pdf(Beta(4510, 481)), pdf(Beta(4966, 47)))
= 50.30727
Table B.1: Posterior distributions for the Chest Clinic Network.
Link Posterior Distributions (Beta Distributions)
P(T | A) Beta(10,99) Beta(106,9789) Beta(99,10) Beta(9789,106)
P(L | S) Beta(481,4510) Beta(47,4966) Beta(4510,481) Beta(4966,47)
P(B | S) Beta(3019,1972) Beta(1514,3899) Beta(1972,3019) Beta(3899,1514)
P(E | T) Beta(115,1) Beta(523,9365) Beta(1,115) Beta(9365,523)
P(E | L) Beta(527,1) Beta(111,9365) Beta(1,527) Beta(9365,111)
P(D | B) Beta(3638,895) Beta(725,4746) Beta(895,3638) Beta(4746,725)
P(D | E) Beta(520,118) Beta(3843,5523) Beta(118,520) Beta(5523,3843)
P(X | E) Beta(624,14) Beta(454,8912) Beta(14,624) Beta(8912,454)
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B.1.2 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE S → B
L_S(S → B) = min(pdf(Beta(3019, 1972)), pdf(Beta(1514, 3899)),
pdf(Beta(1972, 3019)), pdf(Beta(3899, 1514)))
= 56.88552
B.1.3 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE B → D
L_S(B → D) = min(pdf(Beta(3638, 895)), pdf(Beta(725, 4746)),
pdf(Beta(895, 3638)), pdf(Beta(4746, 725)))
= 49.30178
B.1.4 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE L→ E
L_S(L→ E) = min(pdf(Beta(527, 1)), pdf(Beta(111, 9365)),
pdf(Beta(1, 527)), pdf(Beta(9365, 111)))
= 129.2983
B.1.5 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE T → E
L_S(T → E) = min(pdf(Beta(115, 1)), pdf(Beta(523, 9365)),
pdf(Beta(1, 115)), pdf(Beta(9365, 523)))
= 103.7509
B.1.6 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE A→ T
L_S(A→ T ) = min(pdf(Beta(10, 99)), pdf(Beta(106, 9789)),
pdf(Beta(99, 10)), pdf(Beta(9789, 106)))
= 14.75256
B.1.7 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE E → X
L_S(E → X) = min(pdf(Beta(624, 14)), pdf(Beta(454, 8912)),
pdf(Beta(14, 624)), pdf(Beta(8912, 454)))
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= 70.69412
B.1.8 FINING THE STRENGTHS OF THE EDGE E → D
L_S(E → D) = min(pdf(Beta(520, 118)), pdf(Beta(3843, 5523)),
pdf(Beta(118, 520)), pdf(Beta(5523, 3843)))
= 25.69412
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APPENDIX C
COMPUTATION OF MUTUAL INFORMATION LINK
STRENGTH
C.1 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We will use the mutual information link strength measure (MI) to compute the strengths
of links of the original Chest Clinic Network. For each link X → Y in the Chest Clinic
Network, given the probability for variable X and the conditional probability for variable
Y (Chest Clinic Network conditional probabilities are shown in [34]), we will calculate
the joint probability for variables X and Y (P (X,Y )) in order to be able to compute the
strength of every link X → Y using the mutual information equation (Equation 4.2).
C.1.1 THE EDGE A→ T
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable A be P (A = yes) = 0.01, and
the conditional probability for variable T be as follows:
We will compute the the joint probability of variables A and T and the marginal prob-
ability of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
Table C.1: The conditional probability for variable T
A
T yes no
yes 0.05 0.01
no 0.95 0.99
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Table C.2: The joint probability for variables T and A
A
T yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.0005 0.0099 0.0104
no 0.0095 0.9801 0.9896
Marginal Probability 0.01 0.99 1
P (T = yes, A = yes) = P (T = yes | A = yes)P (A = yes)
= 0.01 ∗ 0.05
= 0.0005
P (T = yes, A = no) = P (T = yes | A = no)P (A = no)
= 0.99 ∗ 0.01
= 0.0099
P (T = no,A = yes) = P (T = no | A = yes)P (A = yes)
= 0.01 ∗ 0.95
= 0.0095
P (T = no,A = no) = P (T = no | A = no)P (A = no)
= 0.99 ∗ 0.99
= 0.9801
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link A→ T as follows:
MI(T,A) =
∑
t∈T,a∈A
P (t, a)log2(
P (t, a)
P (t)P (a))
= 0.0005 ∗ log2( 0.00050.01 ∗ 0.0104) + 0.0099 ∗ log2(
0.0099
0.99 ∗ 0.0104)
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Table C.3: The conditional probability for variable B
S
B yes no
yes 0.6 0.3
no 0.4 0.7
+ 0.0095 ∗ log2( 0.00950.01 ∗ 0.9896) + 0.9801 ∗ log2(
0.9801
0.99 ∗ 0.9896)
= 0.0005 ∗ log2(4.8077) + 0.0099 ∗ log2(0.9615)
+ 0.0095 ∗ log2(0.96) + 0.9801 ∗ log2(1.0004)
= 0.0006
C.1.2 THE EDGE S → B
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable S be P (S = yes) = 0.5, and
the conditional probability for variable B be as follows:
We will compute the the joint probability of variables S and B and the marginal prob-
ability of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
P (B = yes, S = yes) = P (B = yes | S = yes)P (S = yes)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.6
= 0.3
P (B = yes, S = no) = P (B = yes | S = no)P (S = no)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.3
= 0.15
P (B = no, S = yes) = P (B = no | S = yes)P (S = yes)
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= 0.5 ∗ 0.4
= 0.2
P (B = no, S = no) = P (B = no | S = no)P (S = no)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.7
= 0.35
Table C.4: The joint probability for variable B and S
S
B yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.3 0.15 0.45
no 0.2 0.35 0.55
Marginal Probability 0.5 0.5 1
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link S → B as follows:
MI(B, S) =
∑
b∈B,s∈S
P (b, s)log2(
P (b, s)
P (b)P (s))
= 0.3 ∗ log2( 0.30.5 ∗ 0.45) + 0.2 ∗ log2(
0.2
0.5 ∗ 0.55)
+ 0.15 ∗ log2( 0.150.5 ∗ 0.45) + 0.35 ∗ log2(
0.35
0.5 ∗ 0.55)
= 0.3 ∗ log2(1.3333) + 0.2 ∗ log2(0.7273)
+ 0.15 ∗ log2(0.6667) + 0.35 ∗ log2(1.2727)
= 0.06665
C.1.3 THE EDGE S → L
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable S be P (S = yes) = 0.5, and
the conditional probability for variable L be as follows:
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Table C.5: The conditional probability for variable L
S
L yes no
yes 0.1 0.01
no 0.9 0.99
We will compute the the joint probability of variables S and L and the marginal proba-
bility of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
P (L = yes, S = yes) = P (L = yes | S = yes)P (S = yes)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.1
= 0.05
P (L = yes, S = no) = P (L = yes | S = no)P (S = no)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.01
= 0.005
P (L = no, S = yes) = P (L = no | S = yes)P (S = yes)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.9
= 0.45
P (L = no, S = no) = P (L = no | S = no)P (S = no)
= 0.5 ∗ 0.99
= 0.495
Table C.6: The joint probability for variables L and S
S
L yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.05 0.005 0.055
no 0.45 0.495 0.945
Marginal Probability 0.5 0.5 1
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At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link S → L as follows:
MI(L, S) =
∑
l∈L,s∈S
P (l, s)log2(
P (l, s)
P (l)P (s))
= 0.05 ∗ log2( 0.050.055 ∗ 0.5) + 0.005 ∗ log2(
0.005
0.5 ∗ 0.055)
+ 0.45 ∗ log2( 0.450.945 ∗ 0.5) + 0.495 ∗ log2(
0.495
0.945 ∗ 0.5)
= 0.05 ∗ log2(1.8182) + 0.005 ∗ log2(0.1818)
+ 0.45 ∗ log2(0.9524) + 0.495 ∗ log2(1.0476)
= 0.0303485
C.1.4 THE EDGE T → E
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable L be P (L = yes) = 0.055,
variable T be P (T = yes) = 0.0104 and the conditional probability for variable E be as
follows:
Table C.7: The conditional probability for variable E
T = Yes T = No
L = Yes L = No L = Yes L = No
E = Yes 1 1 1 0
E = No 0 0 0 1
We will compute the the joint probability of variables E, L and T and the marginal
probability of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
P (E, T, L) = P (E | T, L)P (T, L)
P (E, T, L) = P (E | T, L)P (T )P (L)
P (E = yes, T = yes, L = yes) = P (E = yes | T = yes, L = yes)P (T = yes)
P (L = yes)
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= 1 ∗ 0.0104 ∗ 0.055
= 0.000572
P (E = yes, T = yes, L = no) = P (E = yes | T = yes, L = no)P (T = yes)
P (L = no)
= 1 ∗ 0.0104 ∗ 0.945
= 0.009828
P (E = yes, T = no, L = yes) = P (E = yes | T = no, L = yes)P (T = no)
P (L = yes)
= 1 ∗ 0.9896 ∗ 0.055
= 0.05428
P (E = yes, T = no, L = no) = P (E = yes | T = no, L = no)P (T = no)
P (L = no)
= 0 ∗ 0.9896 ∗ 0.945
= 0
P (E = no, T = yes, L = yes) = P (E = no | T = yes, L = yes)P (T = yes)
P (L = yes)
= 0 ∗ 0.0104 ∗ 0.055
= 0
P (E = no, T = yes, L = no) = P (E = no | T = yes, L = no)P (T = yes)
P (L = no)
= 0 ∗ 0.0104 ∗ 0.945
= 0
P (E = no, T = no, L = yes) = P (E = no | T = no, L = yes)P (T = no)
P (L = yes)
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= 0 ∗ 0.9896 ∗ 0.055
= 0
P (E = no, T = no, L = no) = P (E = no | T = no, L = no)P (T = no)
P (L = no)
= 1 ∗ 0.9896 ∗ 0.945
= 0.935172
Table C.8: The joint probability for variables E, T and L
T = Yes T = No
L = Yes L = No L = Yes L = No
E = Yes 0.000572 0.009828 0.054428 0
E = No 0 0 0 0.935172
In order to obtain the joint probability table for variables E and T , we marginalize the
joint probability table for variables E, T , and L (Table C.8) as follows:
Table C.9: The joint probability for variables E and T
T
E yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.0104 0.054428 0.064828
no 0 0.935172 0.935172
Marginal Probability 0.0104 0.9896 1
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link T → E as follows:
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MI(E, T ) =
∑
e∈E,t∈T
P (e, t)log2(
P (e, t)
P (e)P (t))
= 0.0104 ∗ log2( 0.01040.064828 ∗ 0.0104) + 0.054428 ∗ log2(
0.054428
0.064828 ∗ 0.9896)
+ 0 ∗ log2( 00.935172 ∗ 0.0104) + 0.935172 ∗ log2(
0.935172
0.935172 ∗ 0.9896)
= 0.0104 ∗ log2(15.4254) + 0.054428 ∗ log2(0.8484)
+ 0 + 0.935172 ∗ log2(1.0105)
= 0.0296
C.1.5 THE EDGE L→ E
The joint probability table for variables E and L can be obtained through marginalization
of the joint probability table for variables E, T , and L (Table C.8) as follows:
Table C.10: The joint probability for variables E and L
L
E yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.055 0.009828 0.064828
no 0 0.935172 0.935172
Marginal Probability 0.055 0.945 1
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link L→ E as follows:
MI(E,L) =
∑
e∈E,l∈L
P (e, l)log2(
P (e, l)
P (e)P (l))
= 0.055 ∗ log2( 0.0550.064828 ∗ 0.055) + 0.009828 ∗ log2(
0.009828
0.064828 ∗ 0.945)
+ 0 ∗ log2( 00.935172 ∗ 0.055) + 0.935172 ∗ log2(
0.935172
0.935172 ∗ 0.945)
= 0.055 ∗ log2(15.4254) + 0.009828 ∗ log2(0.1604)
+ 0 + 0.935172 ∗ log2(1.0582)
= 0.2675
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C.1.6 THE EDGE B → D
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable B be P (B = yes) = 0.45,
variable E be P (E = yes) = 0.0648 and the conditional probability for variable D be as
follows:
Table C.11: The conditional probability for variable D
E = Yes E = No
B = Yes B = No B = Yes B = No
D = Yes 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.1
D = No 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9
We will compute the the joint probability of variables D, E and B and the marginal
probability of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
P (D,E,B) = P (D | E,B)P (E,B)
P (D,E,B) = P (D | E,B)P (E)P (B)
P (D = yes, T = yes, L = yes) = P (D = yes | T = yes, L = yes)P (T = yes)
P (L = yes)
= 0.9 ∗ 0.064828 ∗ 0.45
= 0.0263
P (D = yes, E = yes, B = no) = P (D = yes | E = yes, B = no)P (E = yes)
P (B = no)
= 0.7 ∗ 0.064828 ∗ 0.55
= 0.0249
P (D = yes, E = no,B = yes) = P (D = yes | E = no,B = yes)P (E = no)
P (B = yes)
= 0.8 ∗ 0.935172 ∗ 0.45
= 0.3367
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P (D = yes, E = no,B = no) = P (D = yes | E = no,B = no)P (E = no)
P (B = no)
= 0.1 ∗ 0.935172 ∗ 0.55
= 0.0514
P (D = no,E = yes, B = yes) = P (D = no | E = yes, B = yes)P (E = yes)
P (B = yes)
= 0.1 ∗ 0.064828 ∗ 0.45
= 0.0029
P (D = no,E = yes, B = no) = P (D = no | E = yes, B = no)P (E = yes)
P (B = no)
= 0.3 ∗ 0.064828 ∗ 0.55
= 0.0107
P (E = no, T = no, L = yes) = P (E = no | T = no, L = yes)P (T = no)
P (L = yes)
= 0.2 ∗ 0.935172 ∗ 0.45
= 0.0842
P (E = no, T = no, L = no) = P (E = no | T = no, L = no)P (T = no)
P (L = no)
= 0.9 ∗ 0.935172 ∗ 0.55
= 0.4629
Table C.12: The joint probability for variables D, E and B
E = Yes E = No
B = Yes B = No B = Yes B = No
D = Yes 0.0263 0.0249 0.3367 0.0514
D = No 0.0029 0.0107 0.0842 0.4629
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In order to obtain the joint probability table for variables D and B, we marginalize the
joint probability table for variables D, E, and B (Table C.12) as follows:
Table C.13: The joint probability for variables D and B
B
D yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.363 0.0763 0.4393
no 0.0871 0.4736 0.5607
Marginal Probability 0.4501 0.5499 1
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link B → D as follows:
MI(D,B) =
∑
d∈D,b∈B
P (d, b)log2(
P (d, b)
P (d)P (b))
= 0.363 ∗ log2( 0.3630.4393 ∗ 0.4501) + 0.0763 ∗ log2(
0.0763
0.4393 ∗ 0.5499)
+ 0.0871 ∗ log2( 0.08710.5607 ∗ 0.4501) + 0.4736 ∗ log2(
0.4736
0.5607 ∗ 0.5499)
= 0.363 ∗ log2(1.8358) + 0.0763 ∗ log2(0.3158)
+ 0.0871 ∗ log2(0.3451) + 0.4736 ∗ log2(1.536)
= 0.3508
C.1.7 THE EDGE E → D
The joint probability table for variables D and E can be obtained through marginalization
of the joint probability table for variables D, E, and B (Table C.12) as follows:
Table C.14: The joint probability for variables D and E
E
D yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.0512 0.3881 0.4393
no 0.0136 0.5471 0.5607
Marginal Probability 0.0648 0.9352 1
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At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link E → D as follows:
MI(D,E) =
∑
d∈D,e∈E
P (d, e)log2(
P (d, e)
P (d)P (e))
= 0.0512 ∗ log2( 0.05120.0.0648 ∗ 0.4393) + 0.3881 ∗ log2(
0.3881
0.9352 ∗ 0.4393)
+ 0.0136 ∗ log2( 0.01360.0648 ∗ 0.5607) + 0.5471 ∗ log2(
0.5471
0.9352 ∗ 0.5607)
= 0.0512 ∗ log2(1.7986) + 0.3881 ∗ log2(0.9447)
+ 0.0136 ∗ log2(0.3743) + 0.5471 ∗ log2(1.0434)
= 0.02575
C.1.8 THE EDGE E → X
In the Chest Clinic Network, let the probability for variable E be P (E = yes) = 0.0.0648,
and the conditional probability for variable X be as follows:
Table C.15: The conditional probability for variable X
E
X yes no
yes 0.98 0.05
no 0.02 0.95
We will compute the the joint probability of variables E and X and the marginal prob-
ability of each random variable. The joint probability can be computed as follows:
P (X = yes, E = yes) = P (X = yes | E = yes)P (E = yes)
= 0.98 ∗ 0.0.064828
= 0.0635
P (X = yes, E = no) = P (X = yes | E = no)P (E = no)
= 0.05 ∗ 0.935172
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= 0.0468
P (X = no,E = yes) = P (X = no | E = yes)P (E = yes)
= 0.02 ∗ 0.064828
= 0.0013
P (X = no,E = no) = P (X = no | E = no)P (E = no)
= 0.95 ∗ 0.935172
= 0.8884
Table C.16: The joint probability for variables X and E
E
X yes no Marginal Probability
yes 0.0635 0.0468 0.1103
no 0.0013 0.8884 0.8897
Marginal Probability 0.0648 0.9352 1
At this point, we are able to use the mutual information formula to compute the strength
of the link E → X as follows:
MI(X,E) =
∑
x∈X,e∈E
P (x, e)log2(
P (x, e)
P (x)P (e))
= 0.0635 ∗ log2( 0.06350.1103 ∗ 0.0.0648) + 0.0468 ∗ log2(
0.0468
0.1103 ∗ 0.9352)
+ 0.0013 ∗ log2( 0.00130.8897 ∗ 0.0.0648) + 0.8884 ∗ log2(
0.8884
0.8897 ∗ 0.9352)
= 0.0635 ∗ log2(3.1513) + 0.0468 ∗ log2(−1.1402)
+ 0.0013 ∗ log2(−5.4739) + 0.8884 ∗ log2(0.0945)
= 0.2236
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APPENDIX D
CORRUPTED CASES USED TO ADD LINKS TO CHEST
CLINIC NETWORK
D.1 CORRUPTED CASES USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
In this appendix, we present the cases that were added to the dataset DB1 with the goal of
introducing malicious links to Chest Clinic network. The added cases are as follows:
D.1.1 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK D − S
Table D.1: 74 cases to be added to DB1 to introduce the link D − S
X B D A S L T E
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
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Table D.1 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
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Table D.1 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
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Table D.1 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
No No Yes No Yes No No No
D.1.2 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK B − L
Table D.2: 13 cases to be added to DB1 to introduce the link B − L
X B D A S L T E
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
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Table D.2 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
D.1.3 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK A− E
Table D.3: 3 cases to be added to DB1 to introduce the link A− E
X B D A S L T E
No No No Yes No No No Yes
No No No Yes No No No Yes
No No No Yes No No No Yes
D.1.4 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK T − L TO BREAK THE UNSHIELDED COLLIDER E
Table D.4: 8 cases to be added to DB1 to break the unshielded collider E
X B D A S L T E
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
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Table D.4 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
D.1.5 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK T − L TO CHANGE THE DIRECTIONS OF THE TRIPLE
T − E − L
Table D.5: 17 cases to be added to DB1 to change the directions of the triple T − E − L
X B D A S L T E
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
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Table D.5 continued from previous page
X B D A S L T E
No No No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No Yes Yes No
D.1.6 CASES TO INTRODUCE THE LINK B − L
Table D.6: 13 cases to be added to DB1 to introduce the link B − L
X B D A S L T E
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
No Yes No No No Yes No No
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